

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS



CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF ABRI IN INDONESIAN SOCIO-POLITICAL LIFE

by

I Gede Wajan Sardjana

June, 1995

Principal Advisor:
Associate Advisor:

Thomas C. Bruneau
Sterling D. Sessions

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19960116 064

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 1995	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF ABRI IN INDONESIAN SOCIO-POLITICAL LIFE		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) I Gede Wajan Sardjana			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The argument in this thesis is the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) has a legitimate role in socio-political affairs and political life as well as roles in the defense and security of Indonesia. This dual function of ABRI allows ABRI officers to be actively involved in the decision making process of the country. During the New Order Era, many ABRI officers were assigned to key positions of the government; state ministers, governors, district heads, and other high ranking officials at both the central administration and the regional level. Excessive implementation of ABRI's dual function has resulted in many criticisms. The end of Cold War and the end of the East-West rivalry has brought the beginnings of a new world order. The issues of democratization, human rights, environment, and openness are common throughout the world, including Indonesia. These global issues have increased the wave of criticism toward ABRI involvement in political life of Indonesia. In addition, the success of government's development programs has resulted in a more informed and conscious society which has begun to question the relevance of ABRI's involvement in socio-political affairs. This thesis describes some aspects of ABRI's dual functions, its future prospects, and some proposed actions necessary for future implementation of ABRI's dual function.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Dual Function, ABRI, Socio-political, Indonesia, Civil-military relations.		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 97	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 298-102

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF ABRI IN INDONESIAN
SOCIO-POLITICAL LIFE**


I Gede Wajan Sardjana
Lieutenant Colonel, Indonesian Army
Indonesian Armed Forces Academy, 1976

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT**
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


June 1995

Author:




I Gede Wajan Sardjana

Approved by:




Thomas C. Bruneau, Principal Advisor



Sterling D. Sessions, Associate Advisor



David R. Whipple Jr., Chairman
Department of Systems Management



Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

The argument in this thesis is the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) has a legitimate role in socio-political affairs and political life as well as roles in the defense and security of Indonesia. This dual function of ABRI allows ABRI officers to be actively involved in the decision making process of the country. During the New Order Era, many ABRI officers were assigned to key positions in the government; state ministers, governors, district heads, and other high ranking officials at both the central administration and the regional level. Excessive implementation of ABRI's dual function have resulted in many criticisms. The end of Cold War and the end of the East-West rivalry has brought the beginnings of a new world order. The issues of democratization, human rights, environment, and openness are common throughout the world including Indonesia. These global issues have increased the wave of criticism toward ABRI involvement in political life of Indonesia. In addition, the success of government's development programs has resulted in a more informed and conscious society which has begun to question the relevance of ABRI's involvement in socio-political affairs. This thesis describes some aspects of ABRI's dual functions, its future prospects, and some proposed actions necessary for future implementation of ABRI's dual function.

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	




TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BASIS.....	7
A. DEFINITION	7
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	8
1. The Struggle for Independence Period	9
2. Revolutionary Period (1945-1949).....	12
3. Liberal Democracy Period (1949-1959).....	14
4. Guided Democracy Period (1959-1966)	19
5. The New Order Period (1966 to the present)	22
C. ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION: LEGAL BASIS	25
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION IN	
THE NEW ORDER ERA	29
A. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW ORDER	29
B. ABRI'S SOCIO-POLITICAL FUNCTION: OPERATIONAL GUIDE- LINES....	31
C. ABRI ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE ITS ORGANIZATION	33
1. Principles	33
2. Assignment Pattern	37
D. ROLES OF ABRI'S FACTION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DPR)....	39
1. Role As A Stabilizer And A Dynamizer	40
2. Roles In The Decision Making Process	41
E. ABRI EXECUTIVE ASSIGNMENT	42
1. Toward Political Stability.....	42
2. Toward High Economic Growth	43
F. PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS	45

IV. FUTURE PROSPECT OF ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION	53
A. DETERMINING FACTORS	53
1. Impacts of Global Issues	53
2. Internal Perspectives.....	54
3. President's Policy Outcome	55
B. ABRI IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT	57
1. Existence of ABRI's Dual Function.....	57
C. ABRI'S NEW PERSPECTIVE.....	61
D. NECESSARY STEPS.....	64
1. Political Concept	65
2. Structure	66
3. Socialization	68
4. Professionalism	68
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	71
A. CONCLUSION	71
B. RECOMMENDATIONS	74
APPENDIX.....	77
REFERENCES	81
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION.....	85

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my heartfelt thanks and gratitude to my thesis Advisor, Professor Thomas C. Bruneau, and my thesis Associate Advisor, Professor Sterling D. Sessions, who continuously supervised and advised me in completing this thesis. I also wish to thank the many people that assisted me in completing my thesis such as my thesis editor, Sam & Lee Henley, Staff Officers of the Office of Indonesian Military Attache, Major Yudhie, and the many people who have provided me with publications and information sources used in my thesis.

Finally, the blessing and support I received from my family members were constant sources of inspiration. The love, affection and support of my wife, Atiek Sri Siswathy, my children, Nia, Dikha, and Kartika, sustained me in the tribulations of writing this thesis. My parents and my mother-in-law who continuously prayed for my success in this opportunity of study at NPS. I, however, take full responsibility for any errors that may occur in this thesis.

I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, a country in Southeast Asia, has a very long story of struggling. The country, which consists of thousand of islands, stretches about 3,000 miles across the equator, lays on the cross road between two oceans, Pacific and Indian, and bridges two continents, Asia and Australia. Indonesia's position makes it very strategic both economically and politically.

At the beginning of the Middle Ages in Europe, Indonesia found itself under the influence of Hinduism and Buddhism from India which led to the development of two powerful kingdoms: The Hindu kingdoms, the 9th century, "Sriwijay" on Sumatra and in the 14th century "Majapahit" on Java. Islamic culture was introduced in about AD 1400 which peaked with the powerful Islamic dynasty, "Mataram" in central Java in the late 16th century. European culture was introduced in the early 16th century by Portuguese traders who arrived in the country in the Molucca islands group for cloves and other spices. Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) conquered the archipelago in 1605 and continued to rule until 1799, when the VOC was dissolved. After that the islands of Indonesia came under the direct rule of the Netherlands until it was conquered by Japanese troops in 1942.

During the period of Dutch occupation, they applied the system of indirect rule in which native chieftains, known as Regents, were utilized to serve its need to obtain export produce such as coffee, and sugar. A European official known as Resident was posted at a suitable headquarters to see that the native Regent fulfilled his obligations. Special officers were also appointed to serve as the eyes and ears of the Residents with a duty of supervising cultivation. Basically, in indirect rule the native chieftain was in charge of native affairs and the European agent looked after the business of the company. The relationship between the native chieftains and the European officials were described as those of an elder brother and younger brothers. Dutch colonial policy has always had

three basic principles: indirect rule, the protection of the people against oppression, and the retention of native land in native hands. But in practice the Dutch used violent measures against the people in order to obtain agricultural produce for its exports. They often forced the people to surrender their agricultural produce to VOC which led to animosity towards the Dutch rulers. To enforce its policy, VOC also formed its own troops and influenced the local Sultan or King by providing them with security protection. This strategy was considered very effective for VOC and led to greater profit. However, often the Sultan refused the Company's offer which resulted in armed clashes between the Sultan's troops and the VOC's. None of the Sultans' efforts resulted in the improved conditions. A policy of ruthless exploitation by "divide and rule" tactics was carried out by VOC by which it gradually paralyzed inter-island trade. These tactics created even worse conditions for the Sultanate. In addition, for the purpose of maintaining the high price of cloves in the European market, the Dutch undertook their notorious "Hongi" expeditions, whereby they burned down the clove gardens of the people in an effort to eliminate over production. In this outrageous expedition countless atrocities were committed against people who were defending their crops.

Great animosity for the Dutch arose among the people. Sporadic fights between groups of people and the Dutch were frequent. This situation continued until the beginning of World War II, when Japanese troops landed in Indonesia in 1942. Fortunately, just before the Japanese troops landed in Indonesia, the Dutch had recruited some Indonesian people into the Dutch Colonial Army called "Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger" (KNIL) to reinforce the Dutch troops fighting against the Japanese for the defense of the Dutch colony. It is important to note that after the independence, KNIL was organized into the Indonesian Regular Army along with other struggling groups or militia and military trained officers such as PETA, Heiho, etc.

Japanese troops came to Indonesia, identified themselves as "old brother", and promised to liberate the country from the Dutch occupation. At the beginning of their presence in Indonesia, Japanese troops appeared very benevolent, but later they were

worse than the Dutch. The Indonesian people soon realized that the occupation was an exchange of Dutch colonialism for Japanese imperialism. To further the cause of Indonesia's Independence, Sukarno and Hatta appeared to cooperate with the Japanese authorities, but in reality, they and other Indonesian leaders went underground, and masterminded insurrections throughout the country. Under the pressure of the war where the Japanese supply lines were interrupted and the increasing insurrection activities, the Japanese ultimately gave in and allowed the "red-and-white" flag to fly as the Indonesian national flag. The United States bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, led to the Japanese surrender to the United States. This opportunity was used by the Indonesian leaders to proclaim Independence, which took place on August 17, 1945. One important thing can be noted from the Japanese occupation was that the Japanese had recruited and trained some Indonesian youth to be disciplined-officers who after the Indonesian Independence became the nucleus of the Indonesian Regular Army along with other sources.

After the declaration of independence, some government institutions were established including the National Armed Forces. The National Armed Forces was organized from many sources among them were the Dutch and Japanese trained officers. This newly born armed force was soon faced with military threats from both outside and inside the country. From outside, British forces landed in Indonesia as a contingent of the Allied Forces to disarm the Japanese troops. Dutch troops also seized this opportunity to land in the country for different purposes, to regain control over the country. Inside threats came from groups of people who were not satisfied with the central government's policies. They organized rebellion and demanded independence separate from Indonesia.

In order to restore order and to maintain the unity of the country, the armed forces (army) together with the people fought hand-in-hand to crush the rebels and foreign forces. Evidences showed that cooperation between the army and the people in restoring order was very effective. This inspired the army's strategist to formulate the "Total People's Defense System" which has now become the defense strategy of Indonesia. In this system, all national resources will be involved in the defense effort of the armed

forces. The common purpose between people and the armed forces later became fundamental to the success of ABRI's missions, to defend the unitary state of Indonesia based on Pancasila and UUD 1945, and to maintain national stability in order to support the success of development programs. Nowadays, in the development era, most of ABRI's activities are oriented to the well-being of the people. ABRI considered that ABRI originated with the people, is a part of the people of Indonesia, and that ABRI struggled with the people for the independence of Indonesia. Consequently, ABRI is inseparable from the people of Indonesia.

ABRI has struggled along with the people to save the country from any form of threats and ABRI has been successful in defending the country and preventing its fragmentation. This is why ABRI considered itself different from other countries' armed forces. ABRI is not a mere tool of the government but is actively involved in the decision making process. Thus, ABRI considered itself similar to other groups in Indonesian society. This way of thinking led ABRI's leaders to the concept called "Dwi Fungsi ABRI" or dual function of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Dwi Fungsi ABRI obliged ABRI to conduct not only security and defense roles but also social and political roles. Dwi Fungsi ABRI has been a legitimate role adhered to by all ABRI personnel since it was institutionalized in 1960 and will continue into the indefinite future. In the past, especially in Suharto's administration, ABRI was given a wide range of opportunities in the government. Some ABRI officers either in active duty or retirement were appointed to occupy strategic positions in government such as cabinet minister, governor or other key positions in the bureaucracy. Although Suharto's administration was dominated by military personnel, the government was not considered a military regime because the government's day-to-day practices were based on the 1945 constitution, and, not based on military rules.

ABRI with its dual function involved itself both in supra and infra political structures. These structures have been in existence since ABRI was born in 1945. The people also realize that ABRI plays an important role in moving the country toward its

ultimate goals. Since ABRI has been actively involved in social and political life, the country has achieved a lot of progresses. Development programs have successfully been conducted and moved the country to become one of the new industrialized countries (NIC). With an average of 6 percent gross domestic product growth in 1993-1994, Indonesia was considered one of the most successful developing countries in the management of its economy. However, a lot of Indonesian people suspected that ABRI's dual function is only ABRI's tactic for channeling its members to occupy important positions in the government, and some people thought that ABRI's dual function has no legal basis; it's against democratic principles which practiced in developed countries such as The United States, Britain, etc. This fact showed that most of the younger generation, especially university and high school students, do not understand what ABRI's dual function is.

The Cold War is over and global tension has subsided between the two superpowers; this has ended the settlement of regional conflicts at an international level. New challenges for the developing countries have been realized. The issues of human rights, democratization and liberalism, and openness had strongly influenced the way people think especially those of developing countries. In addition, rapid development of information technology such as television and computers have resulted in a more informed people. In the case of Indonesia, which having achieved great success in its development programs, will also experience the negative impact of these global influences. Democracy imposed by developed countries may not fit Indonesia which has many cultural differences from those of developed countries. It is common in developing countries to think that anything or principle from developed countries is the only solution to the countries' problems. The established values that have been practiced for a long time might be challenged, and so it is with the practice of Dwi Fungsi ABRI. Based on the information they received from mass media and the education they received from school, the younger generation intellectuals will begin to question the practice of Dwi Fungsi ABRI in Indonesian political life. They may ask many questions regarding the

involvement of ABRI in political affairs in Indonesia. Some of them may perceive those practices positively and some of them may look otherwise which may lead to instability.

Considering the facts mentioned earlier, I sought to clarify and analyze some aspects of Dwi Fungsi ABRI and find some possible solutions to the problems resulting from change in Indonesian society. In order to do so, this thesis is organized into five chapters. The opening chapter contains some information about Indonesia and an overview of ideas that lead to this thesis. In Chapter II I will try to answer the question of why ABRI has two functions by analyzing the historical background and legal basis of ABRI's dual function. Chapter III explains the implementation of Dwi Fungsi ABRI in the New Order Era and problems arising regarding its practices. Chapter IV analyzes the future prospect of Dwi Fungsi ABRI and possible solutions that should be taken by ABRI leadership in order to enhance the effectiveness of implementation of Dwi Fungsi ABRI in modern Indonesian society. Chapter V summarizes and concludes the analyses with some recommendations that might be necessary for more success in future implementation of ABRI's dual function.

II. ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BASIS

A. DEFINITION

ABRI's Dual Function or Dwi Fungsi ABRI is defined as functions possessed by and adhering to the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) as defense and security forces and as social forces, in the context of the national struggle to achieve national goals in accordance with the national ideology, "Pancasila," the five fundamental principles: Belief in the One God; A just and civilized humanity; Indonesian unity; Populism guided by wisdom in consultation and representation; Social justice for the whole Indonesian people, and the national constitution, "1945 Constitution (UUD 1945)." Based on this definition, ABRI together with other socio-political forces, works hand-in-hand in order to achieve national goals, a just and prosperous Indonesian Society based on Pancasila and UUD 1945¹. So, the essence of ABRI involvement in politics is the spirit and commitment of ABRI as freedom fighters and as the people's army to serve the country and struggle together with other social forces of Indonesia for the people's well-being, safeguarding the unity of Indonesia. The primary interest of Indonesian military in politics is to increase national resilience through development and modernization. Therefore the socio-political functions of ABRI are directed towards intensifying the acceleration of national development. The ABRI's objectives include the ideological, political, economical, socio-cultural, and spiritual field of the country. In the ideological field, the objective of socio-political functions of ABRI is to strengthen the belief in the spirit of the Pancasila in every area of national and social life. In the political field, the objective of socio-political functions of ABRI is the realization of a democratic socio-political life based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and to promote a healthy national leadership and achieve a consensus among all political leaders for the aims of

¹ UUD 1945 stands for Undang-undang Dasar 1945 or Indonesia's constitution which was established in 1945.

national development. In the economic field, the objective of socio-political functions of ABRI is to create a national economy based on economic democracy where every citizen has the freedom to choose a job and has the right to have a decent job and income. Other goals in the economic sphere are to undertake modernization in every field, agriculture and industries. In the spiritual and religious field, the objectives of socio-political functions of ABRI are to promote religious life based on faith in the One God and in a tolerant spirit devoid of fanaticism. In the socio-cultural field, the objective of socio-political functions of ABRI are to develop a healthy national character which is able to withstand the negative influences from abroad as well as from domestic sources. Other goals are to improve national unity, to eradicate differences caused by ethnicity or regionalism and to promote science, technology and national education [Ref. 29]. As stated by ABRI's Chief of Social Political Affairs, Lieutenant General R. Hartono, in "Angkatan Bersenjata" news on November 17, 1994 that socio-political roles of ABRI in social and national life are a consequence of the political conception of ABRI as an integral part of Indonesian society that is responsible for the success of national development programs and the achievement of national goals. This statement implied that Dwi Fungsi ABRI (ABRI's Dual Function) is not only concerned with security and defense matters but it is also concerned with the well-being of all of the Indonesian people.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To understand why the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) is deeply involved in the socio-political life of Indonesia, we have to look back at the history of ABRI's and its role in Indonesia's struggle for its independence and its role later in the period of maintaining, defending, and developing the country and the achievement of the country's goals. The history of ABRI's role in national life is inseparable from the history of Indonesia itself. There are five distinct periods that we can examine in order to obtain the source of ABRI's Dual Function.

1. The Struggle for Independence Period

Indonesia was under Dutch rule for more than 350 years, and under the Japanese occupation for about over three years. The Dutch, four-ship fleet first came to Indonesia in 1596, visiting Banten on the western tip of Java as well as north-coast Javanese ports and returning home with a profitable cargo of spices. They were followed by a subsequent fleet for the purpose of seeking as great a profit as possible. In 1602, however, these companies merged to form the United East India Company (VOC) under the charter issued by the Dutch parliament, the Staten-General.

The United East India Company was not a trading organization solely motivated by profit, but was also responsible for the administration of the Dutch trading areas. It had authority to build fortresses, wage war, conclude treaties with indigenous rulers, and administer justice to subject population. [Ref. 7] The directors of VOC, the Heeren Zeventien, attempted to manage the company from Amsterdam, but it proved impossible and in 1610 the post of governor general was established. Jan Pieterzoon Coen was appointed the first governor general. He was a most dynamic governor general and was able to control and monopolize the spices trade in the islands. To enforce its monopoly, the company formed its own armed troops which violently killed people who tried to go against the Company's rule. To enforce the company monopoly VOC troops once killed or deported the entire population of Banda island of Maluku archipelago when the people continued to sell nutmeg and mace to English merchants. The archipelago was repopulated with VOC indentured servants and slaves who worked for nutmeg groves. [Ref. 7] Those kinds of practices and policies were continued by Coen's successors. Local Sultanates in Sulawesi and Maluku were conquered and in 1669 the Dutch were able to control almost all of the spices and pepper trade outside Java.

Political instability in Java was to the advantage of the Dutch and furthered their interest. Revolt against the incumbent Sultan (King) in Java opened to the Dutch executives the opportunity of involvement in Javanese politics. They used this opportunity to their own benefit. An example of this was when Amangkurat I, King of Mataram in

Central Java, defended his throne from the rebels, he looked for assistance to the Dutch. In return, the Dutch were given a monopoly over the sugar, rice, opium, and textile trade in Mataram. Basically, the political instability in Java, and many wars of successions, were of great advantages to the Dutch company. Its area of control had expanded to almost all of the major cities in Java.

Unfortunately, the Dutch Company had little time to enjoy the fruits of its success. The extraordinary corruption of its personnel had caused the company to fall into bankruptcy. In the 19th century the company was taken over by the Dutch government. A new story of Dutch occupation in Indonesia began.

In replacement of the Company rule with the Dutch government rule, Indonesia experienced the complete transformation of Java into a colonial society and the Dutch were able to extend their area of influence and Dutch colonial rule to Sumatra and the eastern archipelago. The Dutch administration in Indonesia was conducted by civil servants, native and European, and was based on the three principles: indirect rule, the protection of the people against oppression, and the retention of native land in native hands. The archipelago was divided into two major divisions, Java-Madura and Outer Provinces which since 1934 were grouped into three Governments, Sumatra, Borneo, and Great East. However, the Dutch policy and practice was mostly concerned with Java, the Outer Provinces received little attention. During its rule, the Dutch had applied many different systems which were intended to develop its colony. The Culture system was applied between 1830 to 1870. This system theoretically was intended to enhance the people's well-being by allowing the people to furnish an equivalent amount of produce, ordinary export crops needed by government, instead of paying land revenue in cash. They were also encouraged to sell the government additional produce at a lower rate. The implementation of this system depended on the wisdom of the administrative authorities, Regents and Residents. However, Baron van Hoevel, formerly a pastor in Java, impressed on the State General that the Culture System handed the people of Java over to the oppression by their own chieftains. Van de Putte, a planter, convinced Holland that the

Culture System was unprofitable for business and it was replaced by one which was based on the principle that profits should go to private individuals rather than to the public. This new system was known as the Liberal system which lasted between 1870 until 1900. The hopes of liberalism were dispelled by a severe economic crisis in 1883-1885. The economic structure of Indonesia was no longer individualist but capitalist which resulted in the decline of most of Indonesian's native welfare. In 1902 the Queen promised an inquiry into the "the Diminishing Welfare of the People of Java". This system was replaced with the so called "Ethical Policy" which had a two-fold aspect, social and economic. On the economic side it aimed at providing for development by western enterprise with a view to providing funds for the enhancement of welfare. On the social side it aimed at promoting social welfare through the village. This policy failed to enhance the welfare of the people and it was considered as purely artificial and led to the current nationalism among the people. [Ref. 32]

The nationalist movement became stronger and at the end of 1926 there was serious unrest in Java and Sumatra. Actually, national consciousness emerged during the first decades of the twentieth century, developed rapidly during the 1930s, and flourished, both ideologically and institutionally, during the Japanese occupation in the early 1940s. [Ref. 7] The first modern political organized movement, "Budi Utomo" (Noble Endeavor) was founded in 1908. A few years later other political movement organizations were established such as "Indische Partij" (Indies Party) in 1910, "Muhammadiyah" in 1912, "Indies Social-Democratic Association" (ISDV) which became the Communist Association of the Indies in 1921, the "Indonesian Communist Party" (PKI) in 1924, and the "Indonesian National Party" (PNI) in 1928. None of those organizations used non-cooperative ways, in cooperation with the Dutch rulers, in achieving their ultimate goals, the Independence of Indonesia.

When the Dutch consolidated their colonial power in Indonesia at the beginning of the twentieth century after three hundred years of intermittent war, they all but destroyed the indigenous military institutions of the various Indonesian peoples.

However, only after the war with Japan was inevitable, the Volksraad, the Netherland India's Parliament, passed a bill for a native militia which was to be used as an auxiliary force to fight against the Japanese. The forces of the militia were restricted to certain trusted units such as the Legion of Mangkunegoro. It was organized into the Dutch colonial army, the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger-KNIL, and until the Dutch was defeated by the Japanese troops, only a few Indonesian officers achieved the rank of major.

Japanese troops defeated the Dutch and ended the Dutch rule in Indonesia. After the first year of occupation of Indonesia, the Japanese gave basic military training to almost all young and not-so-young Indonesians. They also recruited soldier auxiliaries (Heiho) who, in certain parts of their country, could reach the rank of subaltern officer, established the Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland (Peta-Pembela Tanah Air) in Java and the Volunteer Army (Bo-ei Giyogun) in Sumatra [Ref. 12].

2. Revolutionary Period (1945-1949)

Indonesia proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945, just after the Japanese surrendered to Allied forces in Indonesia on August 15, 1945. The national army was not established right after the independence, however, a kind of armed organization was established, called BKR² (Badan Keamanan Rakyat). The reason why Indonesia did not establish a regular army was to demonstrate its peaceful-politics to the Allied Forces. On October 5, 1945, the Indonesian Army was established with its initial name TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or People's Security Army). This newly born army was soon challenged by the arrival of Allied Forces with Dutch troops in it, aiming for re-establishment of its colonial rule in Indonesia. Poorly trained, with insufficient military

² BKR stands for Badan Keamanan Rakyat means People's Security Body, established by PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence), on its third session on August 22, 1945. Its members consist of the former KNIL, PETA, HEIHO, and other people's struggling groups. BKR is part of BPKKP or Assistance Body for the War Victim Family. BKR is an embryo of present Indonesian Armed Forces known as ABRI.

equipment, inexperienced soldiers were forced to fight against the Dutch troops in order to defend the Indonesian Independence that it had just proclaimed. It was impossible for the Indonesian Army to fight the Dutch troops in conventional warfare. The Indonesian Army adopted guerrilla tactics, and fought hand-in-hand with the people. The struggle of the Indonesian Army in defending the Indonesian independence was political. [Ref. 19]

When the political leaders of the country were captured by the Dutch in December 1948, the effective leadership of the revolution fell into the military hands, although before they were captured they have delegated their authority to one of cabinet minister, Mr. Syarifudin Prawiranegara to establish emergency government in Sumatra. General Sudirman, the Army Commander, decided to continue the war against the Dutch rule with his popular motto "BERJUANG TERUS MET ZONDER PEMERINTAH," which means that the army will continue to struggle defending the Indonesian independence against Dutch forces without government support. The sustained guerrilla war against the Dutch rule began. The army and the people worked hand-in-hand to fight the Dutch in order to retain the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. General Sudirman was holding the central command of the whole operations, but the day-to-day executions were delegated to Java Command Headquarters under Colonel A.H. Nasution and Sumatra Command Headquarters. Colonel Nasution, Commander of Java Command Headquarters, stated that military government is in use throughout Java for the purpose of safeguarding the Republic of Indonesia. Under UN pressure, the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia were willing to solve the dispute at the conference table, and finally the Dutch recognized the Indonesian sovereignty over the former Dutch territory except West Irian as the result of the so called "round table conference"³ held in Den Haag on 23 August-2 November 1949. [Ref. 22]

³ The Round Table Conference reached an agreement with the main points: The formation of the United States of Indonesia with 16 constituent parts, namely the Republic of Indonesia and the 15 "states" made by the Dutch (the territory of the Republic consisted of the remaining territory after Renville, before December 1948). The complete and unconditional transfer of sovereignty by the Kingdom of the Netherlands

During the revolution the Indonesian army was far from a united force. The central military leadership had little power to impose its will on individual units which derived their strength from local bases of support. Popular unit commanders could defy the authority of the central military and political leadership with impunity while unpopular commanders were often deposed by their own troops. Lacking discipline and ideological coherence, rival military forces, especially the politically affiliated "laskar" units, were sometimes embroiled in fighting against each other, leading to several major upheavals within the nationalist ranks. Troops in 1946 influenced by the dissident leader, Tan Malaka, and then arrested the prime minister who was rescued by other troops. Another upheaval happened in 1948 when procommunist army and "laskar" units supported an unsuccessful communist attempts to take over the leadership of the nationalist republic by declaring the Soviet Republic of Indonesia. The army, loyal to the legitimate government, staged a bloody campaign and put down the coup attempt. [Ref. 21]

The guerrilla experiences during the revolution strengthened the political orientation of military officers. In the guerrilla struggle, military and political aspects were inextricably intertwined. The military was not only a security and defense forces but also socio-political forces that handled political, economical, cultural problems of the country.

3. Liberal Democracy Period (1949-1959)

After the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over former Dutch territory, except West Irian, Indonesian society remained deeply divided by ethnic, regional, class, and religious differences. On August 14, 1950, a provisional constitution was proclaimed in which Indonesia adopted a system of parliamentary democracy based on the western

over the whole territory of the Netherlands East Indies (except Irian) to the United States of Indonesia. The formation of the Indonesian-Dutch Union under the Dutch Queen. The debts of the Netherlands East Indies were acknowledged and will be paid by the United States of Indonesia. (See Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia*, Department of Information of Republic of Indonesia, 1979.)

model where the military was under civilian control (Civilian Supremacy) and it was restricted from political activities. With this system, Indonesia tried to adapt itself to a western model of democracy. The government was responsible to a unicameral House of Representatives elected directly by the people, but this system soon proved incapable of producing strong and effective government. The parliament consisted of representatives of a wide range of parties, none of them held enough seats to form a government alone. The result was that the governments necessarily took the form of coalitions between rival parties representing conflicting interests. In a period of seven years, no less than seven coalition governments held office with each of them lasting an average of only a year. The longest one was two years and the shortest was only six months. Increasingly, civilian politicians were regarded as unprincipled opportunists whose pursuit of personal and group interests was at the expense of the nation as a whole. The military considered that there was a need to consolidate the state's institutions in order to form a stable government so that development programs could be started. [Ref. 7, 21, 22]

Under the parliamentary system, Indonesia was rocked by several rebellions. The first was the movement of the so called "The Army of the Just King" (APRA) led by the Dutch Captain Westerling, supporting colonialist Dutch interests. The APRA had as its aim the maintenance of federal structure in Indonesia with a separate army for each of its constituent states. In this way the colonialists hoped to continue its position of power. The second rebellion was the rebellion of Andi Azis, a former captain in the Dutch colonial army who was recently accepted into the Indonesian army. His aim was to reject the placement of federal troops from the TNI⁴ in South Sulawesi, but the rebellion was a failure after only five months. The next rebellion was the revolt of the "Republic of the South Moluccas" (RMS) which wanted to separate itself from the Indonesian federal republic. This rebellion was suppressed by the military loyal to the federal government.

⁴ TNI stands for Tentara Nasional Indonesia or The Indonesian National Army. It composed of the former Dutch colonial army, Japanese trained officers and youth groups.

The political remnants of the insurgents had been sustained superficially by the same colonialist group in the Netherlands. [Ref. 20]

Within the armed forces itself there was conflict among officers regarding the role of the military in politics. Initially the military leadership, which consisted largely of the better-trained ex-KNIL officers, sought to turn the revolutionary guerrilla forces into a disciplined and apolitical professional army on the western model under the control of civilian government. Meanwhile, the ex-PETA officers saw little reason for military men to renounce a political role, and also the ex-PETA officers considered that the emphasis on professionalism create disadvantages for them whose training was technically inferior to those of the ex-KNIL group. The growing conflict within the army became entangled with the competition between rival parties in parliament as military factions sought party support and parties sought military support. The climax of this conflict was reached on October 17, 1952 when supporters of the army leadership demonstrated in front of the presidential palace to demand the dissolution of the parliament. The October 17, 1952 affair according to Nugroho Notosusanto was the struggle between forces who needed the autonomy of the army, which was later developed into a socio-political function of the armed forces, and the forces which agreed to the concept of civilian supremacy over the military. To solve this conflict, a formal reconciliation effort was initiated. A meeting was held in Yogyakarta in February 1955, which resulted in the declaration of an agreement known as "Yogya Agreement."⁵ Senior officers of all groups pledged to uphold unity in a ceremony at the grave of the late Commander-in-Chief, General Sudirman. [Ref. 5, 22]

⁵ Yogya agreement consists of several points: Unite the army and maintain professionalism. The seventeenth affair should be considered finished. Officers were not allowed to be active in politics. The army recognized that it was subordinated to the government, and it must draw a clear line between the political interest and the army's interest. See Soebijono, SH, Development of Socio-political function of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Gajah Mada Press, 1992

Finally, all problems regarding the Seventeenth October affair were resolved by the government. However, there was no complete solution to this problem within the army itself which resulted in long-term internal conflict within the army. When Major General Bambang Utoyo was appointed Army Chief of Staff, acting Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Z. Lubis, refused to give up his position. Major General Bambang Utoyo resigned and this resulted in the dissolution of the Ali Sastroamidjojo's cabinet on July 24, 1955. Since that time the Indonesian Armed Forces (the Army) has been recognized as a socio-political force. [Ref. 22]

Another important political event in the period of liberal democracy was the failure of the Constituent Assembly resulting from the 1955 general election, to formulate a constitution. The army supported the idea that Indonesia should return to the Constitution of 1945 which calls for a strong executive. It was also hoped that by returning to the 1945 Constitution, the spirit of the Revolution of 1945 could be renewed and overcome the general atmosphere of frustration at that time. This resulted in the July 5th presidential decree which stated three points: [Ref. 20, 22]

- Revalidation of the 1945 Constitution.
- The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.
- Form a temporary People's Consultative Assembly and a Supreme Advisory Council as soon as possible.

Following the presidential decree, the government formed a cabinet called "Kabinet Kerja I" or Working Cabinet I, in which eight military officers involved in it acted as ministers or other high ranking officials in the cabinet. In July 1959, a temporary People's Consultative Assembly and a Supreme Advisory Council were established, meanwhile the House of Representatives (DPR) which resulted from the 1955 general election, declared its willingness to work in accordance with the 1945 Constitution.

Liberal democracy failed to produce stable government; in a period of seven years no less than seven coalition governments held office, the longest for two years and the

shortest for six months. This failure, in the army view, resulted from the incompetence and venality of self-seeking party politicians. However, Harold Crouch identified that the failure of liberal democracy also resulted from the role of some military officers themselves in contributing to the conditions with which the civilian government could not cope [Ref. 21].

During the liberal democracy period, there was a "rethinking process" in the military which later became the basis of the present ABRI's Dual Function conception. During that time the military leaders, especially the army, began to think what position and roles should the ABRI take in order to enhance national stability and defend the country based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. In a speech before the National Military Academy, Magelang, General Nasution, stated that the Indonesian armed forces should be actively involved in the maintenance of the country, but it was not meant that the armed forces dominate and monopolize the authority as in the military junta. He realized that, that was against the Sapta Marga⁶. He also stated that in a state based on Pancasila, the Armed Forces has a position and role as one of Indonesian revolutionary social force which work hand-in-hand with other social forces in order to defend and develop the country. This conception later known as "The Army's Middle Way." Furthermore, he explained that if the armed forces were left out of the process of maintaining the country, the political forces, which like a volcano's magma, could

⁶ Sapta Marga is the seven pledges of the armed forces: We are citizens of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based upon Pancasila. We are Indonesian patriots, supporters and defenders of the ideology of the state, who are responsible persons and who are not acquainted with surrender. We are knights of Indonesia, who are devoted to God Almighty, and who also defend honesty, truth and justice. We are soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, guards of the Indonesian State and Nation. We are soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, holding fast to discipline, obedience and loyalty to our leaders, and upholding the attitude and honor of the soldier. We are soldiers of the Armed Forces of the republic of Indonesia, emphasizing knightliness in carrying out duties and ready at all times to give devoted service to state and nation. We are soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, faithful, keeping promises and fulfilling the Soldiers' Oath.

explode at any time. According to Michael R. J. Vatikiotis the Middle Way concept described the early evolution of the doctrine General Simatupang wrote:

The political instability and tensions or even antagonism between the political parties forces the army leadership to look seriously into the problem of how such a stabilizing role could be performed without falling into the pitfall of a Latin American situation. [Ref. 13]

To summarize, during the liberal democracy period ABRI, or the military, was kept busy with military operations to suppress rebellion in various parts of Indonesia. Those operations brought the military into close contact with the people and also brought the military leaders to rethink the military position and role in the states' life which led to the concept of the Army's Middle Way. The armed forces would not follow the western model as merely the government's instrument, and it should not take over the government because this would only lead to series of coups and counter coups. Instead, the military should participate in all areas of politics, economy, and social life but never seek to dominate the government.

4. Guided Democracy Period (1959-1966)

The system of Guided Democracy was based on the presidential "1945 constitution" which was reintroduced in 1959 through the "July Fifth Presidential Decree" in place of the parliamentary constitution. With this system President Sukarno returned to the center of the political stage after being confined to a largely figure-head role during the parliamentary period. The Guided Democracy system had enabled President Sukarno to appoint its cabinet and also to appoint parliament which was against the principles of democracy itself. In introducing the system, President Sukarno gained support from the army leadership, but when Guided Democracy was implemented the army leadership became rivals for power. The policy of President Sukarno was initially well-received by the public because it was widely believed at that time that a strong and clean government had come and would bring the people toward a prosperous and just society. But this hope was dashed, because the country was brought from one extremity

to another. During the liberal democracy the country suffered from rebellions and political instability, and on the other hand under Guided Democracy, the country was introduced to many deviations in the field of ideology, politics, economy, as well as the social culture field, defense, and security. [Ref. 20]

In the field of ideology, Sukarno introduced Marxism which was applied and adjusted into Indonesian culture in the process to replace the state ideology, Pancasila. This was a sign as to how the growing Communist Party influenced Sukarno's mind. Sukarno turned to the Communist Party in a search for his political base in order to balance the power of the military. [Ref. 20, 21] Sukarno conceived the idea of uniting all socio-political groups into the so called NASAKOM⁷. In addition, Sukarno also tried very hard to include Communist Party representatives in his cabinet. He was able to include some communist politicians into his cabinet both in Working Cabinet III (March 6, 1962 - November 13, 1963) and in Dwikora Cabinet (August 27, 1964). His policy was strongly opposed by the armed forces. [Ref. 22]

In order to restrict the advancement of communist influence, the military used martial law to ban communist activities in South Sumatera, South Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. Since 1957, the armed forces has cooperated with certain political groups in order to prevent them from coming under communist influence. For that purpose the army formed cooperative bodies (BKS-Badan Kerja Sama) such as Military-Youth Cooperative Body, Military-Labor Cooperative Body, Military-Peasant Cooperative Body, Military-Women Cooperative Body, etc. Those cooperative bodies were grouped into the so called West Irian Liberation Cooperative Body (BKSPIB-Badan Kerja Sama Pembebasan Irian Barat). [Ref. 22] This body was prepared to support the West Irian Liberation campaign against the Dutch. The Irian campaign was ended with both sides

⁷ NASAKOM stands for National Agama Komunis or the unity forum for national, religion and communist socio-political groups introduced by Sukarno in the end of 1960 which was meant to be the new state ideology in place of the existing ideology, *Pancasila*.

agreeing to sign an agreement prepared by the American diplomat, Ellsworth Bunker which contends that West Irian would be surrendered by the Dutch to a United Nations temporary administration until a free choice election was held.

Because of the communist influence, Indonesia's foreign policy was more likely to lean towards the Republic of China. The enemies of the Republic of China became the enemies of the Republic of Indonesia and the same thing happened with the Republic of China's friends. To realize the Two Camp Doctrine, President Sukarno came up with the idea of forming the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO). [Ref. 20]

In the beginning of 1965, the Indonesian communist Party (PKI) launched the concept of establishing the Fifth Forces which consisted of laborers and peasants. Later it was proven that this idea suggested by Chou En-Lai, China's Prime Minister who also offered one hundred thousand light arms to arm the peasants and laborers. PKI also demanded the NASAKOMization of the military by placing communist commissars in the military organization. Those ideas were strongly opposed by ABRI and then the PKI exposed issues regarding the Gilchrist document and General Council prepared for a coup to the President which was aimed to discredit ABRI. As a result, President Sukarno became closer to the PKI.

. Economically, as a result of extravagant policies, the period witnessed an increasing decline. On orders of President Sukarno a "Revolution Fund" had been formed in 1964 and the money used for various presidential projects. The Bank of Indonesia was permitted to participate in enterprises which resulted in the bank not being able to perform its functions as the regulator of monetary circulation. This stimulated speculation in the economic and commercial world, which generated an inflation rate 600%. [Ref. 20] The Communist Party held demonstrations demanding reduction on consumer goods' price and economic rehabilitation. The Communist Party agitated the army generals with the issue of spreading corruption, which reached its peak on October 1, 1965, with the

kidnapping and killing of some army generals, known as the "September 30th Movement."

During the Guided Democracy period, the government was not truly conducted under the 1945 Constitution. Many deviations to the 1945 Constitution were exercised for the benefit of the President himself. The government could dissolve the parliament just because the parliament could not agree with government's budget proposal. Instead, the government formed a Mutual Self-Help People's Representative with 238 members; 35 of them were military officers. The Communist Party strongly influenced the government policies. Rivalry between the Communist Party (PKI) and the military has moved the President closer to the PKI, and the military political power became stronger under the martial law which gave wide power to central army leadership and regional commanders to participate directly in government decision making process. Thus, during the Guided Democracy system, the armed forces increasingly played a direct role in government and administration: in other words, the military officers unambiguously entered the political elite. [Ref. 20, 21, 22]

5. The New Order Period (1966 to the present)

The Guided Democracy system has brought the Communist Party close to its ultimate goals. By repressing the socio-political forces genuinely adhering to the ideology of the Pancasila, the communists wanted to pave the way for an eventual take over of power. Those efforts culminated in the coup-attempt of September 30th (1965) Movement when communist armed troops kidnapped and killed some high ranking army officers for the stated reason to save the country from coup-attempt by the "Council of Generals," but in fact the PKI attempted to take over the government by using the existing situation it had developed.

The armed forces under the army leadership identified the situation precisely and soon took necessary actions in order to save the country. The Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) Major General Soeharto, in conformity to a standard procedure, took over the temporary leadership of the Army and initiated a series

of steps to control the situation in the Capital. Within 24 hours, the rebel strength was broken and security in the capital, Jakarta, was within the army control. [Ref. 20].

The Army under General Soeharto continued to take necessary measures to restore the situation and with Muslim and other anti-Communist political groups, the army carried out an annihilation campaign against the PKI which resulted in about half a million supporters of the party being killed and another half million detained. The elimination of the PKI deprived Sukarno of a large part of his political base causing the balance of political power to swing decisively in the army's favor. In 1966, President Sukarno's authority declined steadily. His attitude of constantly protecting both the rebels and the PKI as their prime movers caused the loss of people's confidence in his commitment to the country. The people, especially those who lived in Jakarta, held a demonstration demanding three important steps the government must take into account known as TRITURA⁸ or Three People's Demands. [Ref. 20, 21]. When the situation could no longer be controlled, President Sukarno decided to give full authority to General Suharto to take necessary actions in order to guarantee security and stability of the process of government and revolution by issuing the so called SUPERSEMAR or "Order of March 11." Based on this order, General Suharto, on the following day, disbanded the PKI and its subordinate organizations. This decision was strengthened by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly's decision No.XXV/MPRS/1966 regarding the disbandment of the PKI and its subordinate organizations, and the prohibition of Communism, Marxism, Leninist and all forms of its manifestation throughout the country. [Ref. 20, 22]

⁸ TRITURA stands for Tiga Tuntutan Rakyat or Three People's Demands namely: Disband the PKI or Indonesian Communist Party. Purge the Dwikora Cabinet. Reduce Prices. See Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia*, Department of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, 1979, p. 37, and Soebijono SH, *The Indonesian Armed Forces' Dual Function: Role and its development in Political life in Indonesia*, Gajah Mada University Press, 1992, p.32.

The Special Session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly on March 7-12, 1967 appointed General Suharto as acting President of the Republic of Indonesia, and again at the fifth General Session of the MPRS, General Suharto was appointed President until the formation of an elected People's Consultative Assembly. He was appointed president in the first General Session of the elected People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and he was continuously reappointed in the subsequent General Sessions up until the last General Session in 1993. Since the first term General Suharto in the presidential office, he has called his establishment the New Order which promised to consistently maintain and practice the pure realization of the State ideology, Pancasila, and the Constitution of 1945. [Ref. 20, 22]

Under the New Order the ABRI emerged as the dominant political force. Some ABRI officers were appointed to occupy key posts in Suharto's administration although this varies in number for each term. The primary goals of Suharto's administration were to maintain national stability, and to expedite economic growth. To achieve those goals Suharto conducted a series of development plans called "Repelita" or The Five-year Development Plan. Six Repelitas have been successfully conducted during Suharto's 30 years in office, resulting in the improvement of people's living standards and the economy continues to grow. In 1994, in the first year of the President's Second 25-Year Development Plan launched in April the annual GDP was on course for a healthy 6.75 per cent [Ref. 24]. The GDP growth in 1993 was noted to remain strong, and achieved 6.5%, slightly higher than estimated 6.3% in the previous year [Ref. 23].

In order to maintain national stability, the military was organized into a territorial basis with units spread throughout the country more or less parallel with the structure of government administration. Through this structure, according to Harold Crouch, the army could strongly influence civil administration, and severe measures sometimes were taken against real and potential opponents of the regime. [Ref. 21] However, under the New Order, Indonesia has achieved a long lasting stability.

C. ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION: LEGAL BASIS

Historically, ABRI has conducted the socio-political function since the beginning of its history. ABRI's involvement in politics began at the time of its formation during the revolution against Dutch rule and continued ever since. This phenomena is against the western model of democracy which is based on Clauswitz' theory that war is the one way to achieve political goals. This implied that the military must be under civilian control or known as civilian supremacy. Based on this theory, the involvement of the military in politics is considered as unconstitutional. That was not the case in Indonesia. The involvement of the military in Indonesia's political life was and is constitutional and legitimate. Some legal bases of ABRI's roles in politics follow.

The 1945 Constitution (Article 2 Sub 1) stated that the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly) shall consist of the members of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representative) augmented by the delegates from the regional territories and groups as provided by the statutory regulations. The word "groups" in this article is meant as all existing groups in Indonesian society including a functional group. ABRI is one of the functional groups existing in Indonesian society and has the right to send its representatives to the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) which is political. So, ABRI involvement in political life in Indonesia is constitutional. [Ref. 22, 24]

- Article 27 Sub 1) of the 1945 Constitution stated that all citizens have equal status before the law and in government and shall abide the law and the government without any exception. ABRI members are Indonesian citizens who have the same right as others, so, the involvement of ABRI members in government is constitutional. [Ref. 22, 24]
- The Decree of Provisional People's Consultative Assembly No.II/MPRS/1960 stated that: Combat forces and State Police are involved in production process without reducing their primary mission. Social groups are obliged and should do such efforts to achieve national goals. Combat forces and state police as an element of functional groups also responsible to the Institutions in which they were assigned.

- People's Consultative Assembly's decree No.XXIV/MPR/1966 stated that "kekaryaan" or cadre-ization of ABRI should be recognized and guaranteed its existence.
- State Act No.20/1982 Article 26 and Article 28 stated that ABRI has two functions, security and defense, and social forces. In conducting its functions, ABRI must act as stabilizer and dynamist in every effort for the success of national struggle in order to enhance the people's well-being.
- All People's Consultative Assembly's decrees regarding Broad National Policy after the 1971 General election stated that ABRI with its dual function was recognized as fundamental capital for national development.
- State Act No.2/188 emphasize the dual function of ABRI in national life.
- Analyzing ABRI's legal basis of its involvement in political life in Indonesia, we can conclude that it has a solid legal basis. ABRI's dual function is legal according to the constitution, 1945 Constitution, so that means that ABRI's dual function will only disappear when the Republic of Indonesia, which based on 1945 Constitution, also disappear.

From the above description we can also conclude that the involvement of ABRI in politics began at the time of its formation, and that was legal according to the constitution and laws. For a reason why ABRI so involved in socio-political affairs in Indonesia, some arguments can be mentioned as the following:

- The situation during the struggle against colonialist in the struggle for independence dictated that the military must involve itself in decision making process in order to determine the future of the country.
- The party-dominated system of liberal democracy proved unable to produce stable civilian government while the civilian-led system of Guided Democracy, in which the military participated directly, also failed to establish a strong and effective regime. When the military took full power in 1966 it was able to present itself as the only political force capable of guaranteeing order and stability in a nation which had undergone almost continuous political upheaval during the previous two decades.
- With the military directly involved in the decision making process, the country achieved a high economic growth which has benefited all of the

people although it is realized that the gap between the poor and rich is still too wide.

- The Position of the armed forces in the country, which is based on kinship, has brought the armed forces (ABRI) to the same position before the constitution as other groups in Indonesia society. ABRI has the right to actively involve itself in decision making process or in government.

In summary, ABRI has been involved in socio-political affairs since the beginning of its history. When the political leaders were captured by the Dutch, ABRI had to take the lead in order for the the struggle to continue for Indonesian independence. ABRI had to run the day-to-day local and national government administration. This administration is political in nature. Since that time, ABRI has continuously involved itself in the socio-political affairs of the country. The involvement of ABRI in socio-political affairs has been institutionalized and is recognized as an inherent function of ABRI as well as its functions of defense and security. With those two kinds of legitimate functions the ABRI is different from other countries' armed forces.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION IN THE NEW ORDER ERA

A. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW ORDER

After the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965, the military, or the ABRI, dominated Indonesian politics. The army under General Suharto assumed power in Indonesia in 1966/1967. Since then Suharto has continuously held the office of President of the Republic of Indonesia, and in all likelihood this will continue having been re-elected for his sixth-term in the office in the 1993 General Election. To emphasize its discontinuity with the failed and discredited policies of the Sukarno era which the regime calls the Old Order, Suharto's government calls itself the New Order. The New Order is defined as a life system of people, nation and state based on the pure and consequent realization of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. The New Order was put in place as a correction for what were considered to be deviations from the 1945 Constitutions by the Old Order under Sukarno. A major difference between Sukarno's and Suharto's era can also be seen in the characteristics of government policy. Sukarno supported the idea of an unfinished revolution, and stressed the struggle against imperialism. Suharto on the other hand, coming from a family of farmers, and not much influenced by western culture and a western education, put emphasis on economic development as a way to improve people's standard of living.

Under the leadership of General Suharto, the government recruited a group of economists, many of whom had received their training at the University of California at Berkeley. The group known as the Berkeley Mafia, was assigned to create an economic development plan. They proposed a long term development plan which would cover a period of 25 to 30 years. This long term plan was then subdivided into five-year development plans called "Repelita." The first Repelita was initiated and implemented in 1969. To make the plan workable, the New Order government realized that a supportive environment was needed. Based on past experiences, political stability was considered an

absolute requirement. ABRI officers were given great responsibility and wide authority in the government. The government was considered a military regime by western scholars. Ulf Sundhaussen stated that under the New Order the Army with its dual function was no longer the junior partner in the government but, through General Suharto, the only independent force in the government [Ref. 25]. Although the New Order government was dominated by the military, it did not practice militarism or dictatorship. Since the government does not practice military rule in conducting its administration but rather a rule based on the constitution adopted by the people through their representatives in MPR. The President is obliged to implement every decision made by MPR. The President must exercise his administration based on the will of the people, not his own. The New Order has allowed political parties to exist provided they adhere to the Pancasila, and has held general elections which provide for eligible people to vote freely, directly, and secretly. But, in order to safeguard the state ideology, Pancasila, Suharto created his own party, GOLKAR, which in the election campaigns enjoys all the advantages that the government can provide. In every election held since 1971, GOLKAR has consistently out-pollled all other parties together, securing over 60% of the votes.

According to Ulf Sundhaussen's analysis, the greatest impact of the New Order on society is the social change it brought about. The excessive order and stability may have often given the impression that present-day Indonesia is best compared to the dull politics of the colonial era. But it would be more correct to see the New Order socially as a highly dynamic system. It provides the political basis for a capitalist revolution in the rural areas, and has given rise to new societal groups (classes) in urban environments as well. The increasing importance of technocrats and entrepreneurial groups under the New Order has strengthened existing professional associations and led to the formation of new ones. These organizations are either co-opted into the political system, or have turned antagonistic to the military. [Ref. 25] Example of some of these organizations are the ICMI (The Organization of Moslem's Intellectuals of Indonesia), ISEI (The Organization

of Economist of Indonesia), IDI (The organization of Medical Doctors of Indonesia), SBSI (Labor organization) as well as SPSI (Official Labor Organization).

Furthermore, Ulf Sundhaussen stated that the New Order government can be categorized as a veto regime which was formed to ward off the political threat posed by the PKI, and the economic threat in the form of Sukarno's gross mismanagement of the economy. However, it offers more political rights to most of its people than most other developing countries. [Ref. 25]

The New Order under Suharto's leadership will always perceive communism in all of its manifestations as the latent threat to the existence of the Indonesian State based on Pancasila. Communism as an ideology or as a form of government is against the Indonesia national ideology and a democratic government based on Pancasila. Indonesian decisions are made on the basis of consensus (mufakat) to be arrived at by deliberation (musyawarah), neither by parliamentary majorities outvoting minorities nor by party leaders as in the communist countries. The New Order will always commit its every efforts to strengthen national integrity and to enhance the people's well-being in constitutional ways.

B. ABRI'S SOCIO-POLITICAL FUNCTION: OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

As stated previously, the ABRI has been given wide access to the New Order government and it has been given a chance to participate in the development of Indonesia not only as a military force, but also as a socio-political force, known as "Dwi Fungsi" or dual function. In order for ABRI to be successful in implementing its dual function, ABRI needed to formulate guidelines, operating procedures, and the like. In the beginning of the New Order Era there was no unity of concepts regarding how to implement the socio-political functions of ABRI. Each service in the ABRI, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police, had its own doctrine. In order to integrate and strengthen the unity of ABRI, an integrated doctrine was developed in 1966 called "Catur Dharma Eka

Karma”⁹ or Four Mission One Sacred Deed. Catur Dharma Eka Karma (CADEK) includes ABRI’s doctrines both as to a defense and security force, and also as a socio-political force. However, it was felt that CADEK was not enough direction for successful implementation of socio-political function of ABRI in an operational level. In the 1970s, some doctrines, instructions, guidelines, etc. regarding how to implement the socio-political functions of ABRI were in fact published by ABRI members who were assigned to the government and the bureaucracy. Among those doctrines and instructions were: [Ref. 27]

- **Basic Guidelines of Pancasila Implementation for ABRI.** This guideline was intended to give a broad understanding of Pancasila to ABRI personnel. To enable them to be able to diffuse Pancasila broadly to society in the efforts of achieving the national goals.
- **Basic Design for Managing ABRI’s Mentality: “PINAKA BALA DIKA.”** Published as the realization of National Defense and Security Doctrine, and CADEK. It was directed to all ABRI leaders to assist them in the proper implementation of mentality management programs for all of their people. In addition, “Pinaka Bala Dika” was also meant to give a means for ABRI leaders to achieve balance and harmony in managing ABRI as a defense, security force, and as a socio-political force.
- **Soldiers’ Manual: Conduct and Attitude of the Sapta Marga-Soldier** This manual gives directions and guidelines to ABRI leaders in developing conduct and attitude of their people so that their conduct and attitude is in accordance with “Sapta Marga,” the soldier’s seven pledges.
- **“Dharma Pusaka 45.”** This is a formulation of the inheritance values of the 1945 Revolution and of the 1945 Indonesian National Army which became the basis of Indonesian Armed Forces identity.
- **ABRI’s Civic Mission Doctrine.** This doctrine provides guidelines and directions to ABRI members in implementing socio-political function of ABRI. It is directed at the purpose of achieving uniform perception and understanding in conducting the socio-political function of ABRI so as to

⁹ Catur Dharma Eka Karma is the defense and security doctrine of Indonesia which unites doctrines of all the four branches within the ABRI.

guarantee the success of its implementation. In addition, this doctrine is also directed to other socio-political forces of Indonesia in order to achieve a mutual understanding and cooperation in pursuing national goals.

- **Doctrine of Socio-Political Operations.** This doctrine provides guidelines for every ABRI member who is assigned to a socio-political post so that he/she can execute his/her duties effectively and efficiently.
- **ABRI's Manual: Dwi Fungsi ABRI.** It provides guidelines and directions regarding ABRI's dual function so that:
 - Every ABRI member must be able to conduct his/her mission effectively and efficiently.
 - ABRI leaders must be able to educate their soldiers and units about ABRI's dual function.
 - ABRI can be used as a medium for the purpose of forming soldiers who love their country and possess the struggling idealism.

There are some points to emphasize in those doctrines and instructions regarding the implementation of ABRI's socio-political function. ABRI's socio-political function must be conducted democratically, constitutionally, and with respect to the existing law. Besides those guidelines, ABRI's socio-political function is also part of the structure of ABRI's organization at the provincial level and in the capital. It is part of the center chaired by ABRI's Commander in Chief, and provincial level chaired by Commander of Military Area Command or Commander of Military Resort Command.

C. ABRI ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE ITS ORGANIZATION

1. Principles

Before describing the assignment of ABRI's personal beyond ABRI's organization, I want to emphasize some principles regarding the implementation of ABRI's dual functions. As quoted by Bilveer Singh from A. Hasnan Habib, Dwi Fungsi

ABRI: "Asal Usul, Implementasi dan Masa Depan," there were five principles of ABRI's Dual Function that must be considered: [Ref. 28].

- ABRI has a defense and security as well as socio-political function; it is an instrument of the state which is managed by the government of the day. In its socio-political function, it is not a state or government instrument but rather one of the many socio-political forces found in the society. As a socio-political force, it works with similar forces to give meaning to the country's independence, the 1945 Constitution and "Pancasila." It is not government oriented. Rather, it is people-oriented and people-based. Its aim is to promote the interest of the people. It will support fully any government that promotes and protects the people's interest and that is committed to the people, as is enshrined in points 1-3 of "Sapta Marga."
- ABRI's dual function (Dwi Fungsi ABRI) is not a doctrine or theory of civil-military relations as practiced in the West where the military is viewed as an instrument of the civilian politicians. "Dwi Fungsi" also does not propose that there are specific and exclusive domains for the military and civilians. Dwi Fungsi does not admit civil-military relations where one is dominant. Rather, it is based on the familial principle with the object of promoting the interest of the whole community. While not admitting to military or civilian supremacy, it purports that both are equal and thus share equal responsibility for the security and development.
- "Dwi Fungsi" is closely related to the concept of national resilience. This involves voluntary participation of all citizens in national development. Thus, ABRI must ensure that its leaders, especially those who are undertaking non-military functions are oriented toward democracy and are adept in the art of persuasion.
- ABRI personnel are both professional soldiers and freedom fighters. Thus, in addition to being a military professional, an ABRI member must be a soldier citizen, a freedom fighter and a national fighter.
- "Dwi Fungsi" can only be implemented by following the norms contained in the "Sapta Marga." These constitute the code of ethics for ABRI. The first three "margas" relate to ABRI's responsibility as citizens and where they also possess the rights of other citizens. The other four "margas" relate to ABRI's sense of responsibility as member of the armed forces.

Besides principles stated by Hasnan Habib, "SESKOAD Paper"¹⁰ was also argued that there were nine principles that had to be upheld in the implementation of the "Dwi Fungsi" concept. They are:

- The politics carried out by ABRI are those of the 1945 Constitution, not the politics of a group or the politics of ABRI as a group.
- In attaining its political goals, ABRI must use neither its weapons nor the threat of its weapons; neither can it abuse its power as a participant in the political superstructure.
- In carrying out political activities ABRI must use methods of persuasion and constitutional methods and must not resort to force.
- The essence of ABRI's participation as a social force was its participation in defining the direction of the state, namely, in the "MPR" and "DPR."
- ABRI's participation in the executive branch of government was only carried out within the framework of stabilizing and/or dynamizing of that branch.

In carrying out its political policy ABRI does so through deliberations between the leadership and a number of ABRI members who, based on their experience and capabilities are considered capable of forming objective opinions, not opinions fashioned according to the desires of the leadership.

- ABRI's non-military functions must be based on the notions that authority is not based on power; that tension should be broken without using force, of winning without defeating; and that wealth should come not only from material objects, but also from immaterial objects.
- To avoid a decline in ABRI's implementation of "Dwi Fungsi" it must realize that leadership is founded on greatness of spirit and must be realized in word, attitude and action.

¹⁰ The SESKOAD Paper is a paper produced by the Army Staff and Command College through seminars or other types of scientific meetings. SESKOAD, besides its educational functions also functions as a doctrinal research and development arm of the Indonesian Army. It often produces conception papers that contributed to national policies.

- So long as a function can be carried out by another institution or individual with good results then it should be looked after by the institution or individual.

From these principles we can conclude that the assignment of ABRI outside ABRI's organization is not merely channeling the ABRI member for the purpose of getting material advantage or control, but it is to express the spirit, responsibility and loyalty of ABRI to the nation by involving itself in all efforts for the defense of the nation and to enhance the well-being of the people. In addition, ABRI's involvement in socio-political affairs permits ABRI to detect signs of trouble much earlier than would have been the case otherwise. Any deviation from these principles must be considered an attack on ABRI's spirit and commitment to the country and its credentials.

Since 1966, the socio-political function of the armed forces was performed through "Karyawan" or functionaries who are members of the armed forces but serving outside ABRI in both legislative and executive areas. This has led to the common view that "Dwi Fungsi" in the new order era referred to the amalgamation of the normal defense functions of ABRI and ABRI's "kekaryaan" or civic duties. This view gained dominance in the immediate post-G30S era, the era after the aborted communist coup attempt in September 1965, because and as a result of the need to fill the vacuum created by the purge of PKI or PKI-affiliated personnel in the various sectors of society as well as to restore order following the tumultuous events that hit the country.

Under the leadership of President Suharto, the role of ABRI as a socio-political force can be seen in four main areas. First is as a stabilizer. As a result of the coup attempt in 1965 and the bloodshed that followed, there was an urgent need to bring about physical safety and security and this was effectively carried out by ABRI. Its second role is as a dynamizer. Due to the mismanagement of the country by Sukarno, especially in the area of the economy, ABRI had to create a conducive environment for economic development. ABRI's third role is as a pioneer. As other socio-political forces in the country were still weak and incapable, ABRI had to lead the nation in all areas and hence the dominance of ABRI in the country, especially in the first two decades of Suharto's

administration. The fourth role is as a democratizer. It is often forgotten that after the period of liberal democracy from 1950-1957, the country ceased to be a functioning democracy. It was only after 1971 that the country has had regular general elections. This is an important achievement and has not been duly credited. After thirty years, the challenge now for ABRI is to bring the country to a higher plane of democratization. [Ref. 28]. ABRI as stabilizer and dynamizer in socio-political life in the country must create a climate to support and enable the people to openly express their will and opinions. The approach of Security should be more oriented towards the prosperity of Indonesia without affecting the openness of the people to express their will and opinions. The people will then have the feeling that the ABRI is not a watch dog of the government but is truly the people's army and that the ABRI provides for their protection and is struggling with them for their well-being and safety. As dynamizer, ABRI must push forward for the implementation of democracy in the country which is based on Pancasila and requires a consensus to be arrived at by deliberation and is the basis of all decision making.

2. Assignment Pattern

ABRI personnel assignment in organizations outside its own organization is an aspect of ABRI's dual function especially as a socio-political force. As stated previously, ABRI is a socio-political force and has rights and responsibilities equal to other socio-political forces in Indonesia society. The primary purpose of these personnel assignments is to safeguard national ideology and to guarantee the success of the development programs designed by the New Order government. There are five patterns used in assigning ABRI for socio-political positions, these are: [Ref. 27]

- **Obliged by Law.** This assignment pattern is used to fill positions that are required by law such as positions in House of Representatives (DPR) or in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). During the New Order Era, ABRI's representatives in "MPR" was set at 151 (in 1987-1992 period), or one fifth of all members in "DPR" or "DPRD" (Regional House of Representatives).

- **Determined by the People.** These assignment patterns are used to fill positions determined by the will of the people through their representatives in "MPR/DPR/DPRD", such as President/Vice President, Chairman of Auditing Board, Governor, District Head, Mayor, etc.
- **Appointed by President/Head of State.** President/Head of State has a prerogative right to appoint his assistants, so he may appoint any person he wishes to assist him in conducting his administration. The President can appoint ABRI personnel for positions such as ministers, ambassadors or similar positions in the executive.
- **Requested by the Incumbent Government's Executive or the People Through Their Representatives.** The assignment of ABRI in socio-political posts is mostly by requested of executives in order to fill positions that need ABRI's specialties and usually occupy echelon I/II positions in the bureaucracy.
- **Requested by Social Organization.** ABRI assignments to social organizations are to fill requests by those organizations to ABRI Commander in Chief. To assign ABRI personnel for this kind of position, ABRI leadership always considers the urgency and benefit for both requesting organization and ABRI itself.

Thus, the assignment of ABRI personnel outside ABRI's organization is more likely based on requests from outside rather than ABRI channeling its personnel. Basically, the assignment of ABRI personnel outside ABRI's organization is legal, selective in nature, and usually mission oriented. Once they are assigned to civilians positions they must obey the law regarding the domestic administration which determines the duration of an official in office and includes all of its rights and obligations of that official. Usually, ABRI personnel occupy their civilian positions for an average of two terms in office (6 years). However, there are provisions to remove ABRI officers from their positions especially when they are considered to be incompetent. In addition, there are also provisions that ABRI officers can be removed by the people through their representatives in DPR from principal positions in the regional bureaucracy such as governor, district head or mayor.

D. ROLES OF ABRI'S FACTION IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (DPR)

Chapter VII of the 1945 Constitution contains some points regarding rights and responsibilities of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.(DPR-RI). From what is stated in Chapter VII of the 1945 Constitution, we can conclude that the "DPR" has three principal duties, these are: [Ref. 24]

- "DPR" together with the President are responsible for making laws
- "DPR" together with the President are responsible for determining budgets.
- "DPR" is obliged to exercise supervision to the government.

In order to be able to execute its functions, DPR has the rights as the following:

- "DPR" has the right to question the government.
- "DPR" has the right to investigate any deviations on government practices.
- "DPR" has the right to amend bills' draft forwarded by the government.
- "DPR" has the right to promote opinions.
- "DPR" has the right to submit bills.

Membership of the DPR has varied from time to time. This was caused by the changes in the number of the Indonesian population. In the first period of the New Order, in 1967, DPR's membership consist of 350 personnel who represent all political parties and functional groups in Indonesia including ABRI. ABRI's representative during that time was set at 43 individuals (12% of 350). But in February 1968, after being refreshed and redressed, DPR membership consisted of 416 seats in which the ABRI was given 75 seats (18% of the total seats). Based on Law No.2/1985, DPR membership consisted of 500 seats and 100 of them were given to ABRI (20% of the total seats). After the 1983 general election, the DPR membership composed of 299 members of functional groups

(Golkar), 91 members of Development United Party (PPP), 40 members of Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and 100 members of ABRI [Ref. 27].

In conducting its missions as a spearhead of ABRI in DPR, the ABRI faction must be able to enhance and strengthen national resilience by actively involving itself in the decision making process regarding statehood and governmental problems, develop Pancasila democracy, and constitutional life in the country. As stated in the working procedures of ABRI faction in DPR, the faction's mission and responsibilities are as follows:

- Safeguard "Pancasila" and 1945 Constitution.
- Struggle for ABRI's conceptions in development.
- Manage, assign and direct the activities of its members in order to accomplish their mission effectively and efficiently.

ABRI's faction in the DPR must exercise some roles that adhere to ABRI as a socio-political force. These roles are as follows:

1. Role As A Stabilizer And A Dynamizer

The role of dynamizer can be defined as activator element, pioneer, initiator for positive actions, and penetrate any obstacle in achieving consensus. ABRI must be able to act as dynamizer and accelerator of development activities, and must be capable of producing and executing national development conceptions in order to achieve national ideals. ABRI must also actively involve itself in accelerating the transformation processes of values in order to achieve harmony between development progress and social conditions of the present society. Any imbalance of these factors will cause social jealousy which may transform into social upheaval. ABRI must be able to provide a conducive environment for the transformation processes of values and must always be the initiator of efforts in order to accelerate the implementation of this process. To accomplish the role of dynamizer the ABRI requires a deep understanding of development process itself [Ref. 27].

ABRI's role as stabilizer was defined in order to maintain balance and unity of all social forces based on "Pancasila" and "Undang-Undang Dasar 1945" (1945 Constitution) and to maintain consciousness and resilience of mental-ideology, consistent to the struggle principles and goals, anticipate the people aspirations and channeling activity for immediate solutions. ABRI as stabilizer must be able to provide directions and room for values transformation.

The implementation of ABRI's role as dynamizer and stabilizer cannot be separated from each other. Every action or activity of ABRI must reflect its role as dynamizer and stabilizer in order to guarantee dynamic stability. ABRI's roles as dynamizer and stabilizer can be executed by implementing 11 ABRI's leadership principles (Sebelas Azas Kepemimpinan ABRI)¹¹. Of particular importance are the second through the fifth principle. [Ref. 27].

2. Roles In The Decision Making Process

Since the 1945 Constitution was revalidated in 1959 and since the establishment of the New Order government, Indonesia has been practicing "azas musyawarah untuk mufakat" or consensus for deliberation principle in decision making process. Voting is considered as the last resort when all other ways towards a consensus could not bring about a good decision. ABRI in its socio-political roles as stabilizer and dynamizer must always try to find paths to an acceptable and reasonable decision. By always upholding the principles of "demokrasi Pancasila" or Pancasila-democracy and putting forward the national interest above all other interests these paths can be realized. ABRI as stabilizer

¹¹ ABRI's leadership principles: Belief in, and obedience to the One God. To give the right example to one's subordinates. To arouse the spirit amidst one's subordinates. To encourage one's subordinates. To supervise one's subordinates and having the courage to correct them if necessary. To be able to decide priorities. To be modest and not overdoing things. To be loyal to one's superiors, colleagues and subordinates. To be economical. To be open for control and correction. To be willing when the time comes to transfer one's responsibilities and position to the next generation. See Nugroho Notosusanto, "The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia," Department of Information Republic of Indonesia, 1979.p.151.

and dynamizer must understand its position and always set a respectful attitude towards its counterpart in any debate or discussion in order to maintain a feeling of unity and kinship. ABRI should never try to force its will or conception on others and should set an example in the developing Pancasila democracy. Pancasila democracy is based on kinship, because the very basic principle of Pancasila democracy is that kinship principle put people's sovereignty as the highest authority and national interest above individual or group interest. As stated by Indonesian Vice President, Try Sutrisno, Pancasila-democracy is not acquainted with the suppressive ways in the decision making process. A decision is made based on procedures and a constitutional mechanism which protect people's sovereignty as the highest authority and put national interest above individual interest. Furthermore, he stated that Pancasila-democracy system has the nature of uniting, combining toward fresh, cool, togetherness, and kinship climate. [Ref. 28]

E. ABRI EXECUTIVE ASSIGNMENT.

1. Toward Political Stability

Under the New Order, the military emerged as the dominant political force. Military men were appointed by the president to occupy key posts in the government and administration. Many of the key cabinet portfolios, such as Defense and Security, and Internal Affairs, have always been in military hands while other important departments, such as in economic fields, have also been headed by military officers. The number of ministers drawn from the armed forces has varied over time, falling from 12 out of 27 in 1966 to only 4 out of 23 in 1973 before raising again to 11 out of 24 in 1978, and a drop to only 8 out of 38 in 1993 [Ref. 21, 29]. But even when a department is not headed by a minister from the armed forces, there were usually military officers among its senior officials. Military officers were also dominant in the regional administration. The number of provincial governors appointed from the armed forces rose from 12 out of 24 at the end of Guided Democracy period to 22 out of 26 in 1971 and then fell slightly to 19 out of 27 in 1980 with military men heading provincial administration in such key provinces as

Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, and East Java. At the district level about two-third of district and town mayors were military officers [Ref. 21].

The military's domination of the government machinery at all levels enabled it to set the tone of the entire administration. Control of the administration meant that the military could strongly influence government policy. The ultimate goal set by the New Order government was high economic growth in order to enhance the well-being of the people. The primary requirement for economic development is, in the military's view, political stability. Under the New Order government the country has been enjoying a very long period of political stability so that development programs through "Repelitas" were able to be conducted as planned. Military men in the government supported by the security apparatus which was organized based on territorial basis, played a significant role in maintaining political stability.

2. Toward High Economic Growth

The military was not the only strong force in maintaining stability, but also in accelerating economic growth. Under the New Order, the government also recruited civilians to its administration, especially technocrats so that the government could implement a modern (technocratic) economy which was impossible under the Old Order. The government gave considerable scope to its technocratic advisers. The military's capacity to impose political order, and the technocrats' capacity to formulate technically appropriate policies has enabled the government to stabilize the economy and launch its development programs. Long periods of political stability has drawn more foreign investors to invest in Indonesia and this contributed to the acceleration of Indonesians economic growth. Some ABRI's officers were also assigned to chair some key positions in business organizations especially those belonging to the government. The Army leaders believed that military rule would ensure the maintenance of political stability needed for economic development. They hoped that stability would encourage investment, both foreign and domestic, in an expanding modern sector of the economy, such as in extractive industries, large-scale manufacturing, and commerce. The

government's role was seen largely in terms of creating conditions favorable for the exploitation of new commercial opportunities by foreign investors and Indonesian business interests. The result was that Indonesia could raise the living standard of the people.

Twenty five years ago, Indonesia was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita income of only \$50. Since then, it has made great strides, achieving an average GDP growth of almost 7% per annum, a growth performance that ranks among the ten fastest in the world and on par with that of dynamic East Asian economies. Rising at 4.5% per annum over this period, Indonesia's per capita income reached \$650 in 1992, implying a substantial improvement in living standards. The economy grew at nearly 8 per cent throughout the 1970s. In 1993 much of the economic news was good, the economic growth for the year remained strong and is expected to come in at 6.5% which is considered very strong by current East Asian standards, although this economic development was heavily dependent on foreign aid and foreign investment. This economic performance of Indonesia's can be examined through some selected indicators such as GDP growth, Export Growth, Inflation, Debt Service Ratio, and Poverty reduction. In the period from 1967 to 1991, GDP grew at an average of 6 per cent per annum, export at an average of 15 per cent per annum, inflation, about 12% in the period of 1967-73 declined to about 8% in the period of 1986-91, the debt service ratio continues to increase from about 15% in the period of 1967-73 increase to about 32% in the period of 1986-91, and poverty has been reduced from 60% in 1970s to 15% in 1990. [Ref. 35]

ABRI as an organization has its roots deep in the social fabric of the country. And also it realized that ABRI is the people's army, born from the people, struggle with and for the people. So that socio-political function of ABRI is oriented for the well-being of the people. To implement its commitment to the people, ABRI is actively involved in pioneered efforts in order to relieve people from backwardness, isolationism, and poverty. When General M.Jusuf became the Minister for Defense and Security/The Armed Forces Commander in Chief in 1978, he initiated and launched "ABRI Masuk Desa" (ABRI's

return to village) programs which was dedicated to assist villagers to relieve themselves from isolationism, backwardness, and poverty. The scope of ABRI's activities in these programs were directed toward the development of an economic infrastructure such as building roads, bridges, markets, and other activities which were focused on efforts to enhance people's living standard and national consciousness. These programs have been able to develop the village's economy which in turn have contributed to national economic growth.

F. PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS

Although "Dwi Fungsi ABRI" has been institutionalized since the beginning of the New Order era, there are some problems with and thus criticisms of "Dwi Fungsi." The predominant problem facing ABRI during the past implementation of "Dwi Fungsi ABRI" was the inconsistency in the concept and formulation of Dwi Fungsi ABRI itself. Bilveer Singh stated that the dual function of ABRI as envisaged by Sudirman was different from that of Nasution which in turn was different from that of Suharto [Ref. 28]. It is also interesting to note that the armed forces involvement in non-military areas has been adjusted from time to time to suit the prevailing conditions. Many arguments have been offered regarding this problem but the questions regarding this issue will still exist in the future unless the ABRI takes proper action. Problems also exist in assigning ABRI officers for positions outside the ABRI organization. Among these problems are:

- Very limited numbers of officers who qualify for certain positions outside ABRI organization.
- Psychological impact encountered by ABRI personnel assigned outside ABRI organization as a result of rejection of his/her new environment where management practice the management principle "promotion from within."
- The tendency of channeling ABRI personnel into positions outside because of a strong sense of "esprit de corps" among ABRI officers.
- ABRI's organization also needs professional officers to fill its formation.

- There were many who failed to distinguish between Dwi Fungsi and Kekaryaan.

In addition to these problems, ABRI leaders also faced many criticisms and even opposition from younger generation politicians in society to the dominant role of the military in the country's politics. When Nasution first proposed the role expansion of the ABRI, he was vehemently opposed by the various political parties. Yet, ironically, Nasution has become one of the harshest critics of the implementation of ABRI's dual function. As quoted by Bilveer Singh from Salim Said, *The Political Role of the Indonesian Military: Past, Present and Future*:

It is an irony in Indonesian history that Nasution, who conceptualized the political ideology of the military, and led them into the political arena in the 1950s, at the end, became a bitter critic of the implementation of his brainchild.

In many ways, Nasution's doubt and uneasiness with the way the dual function of the armed forces was being interpreted and implemented began when the New Order began consolidating its power and rationalizing the military's dominance in the country, especially during the Second Army Seminar in Bandung in August 1966 which put ABRI as the leading force of the country by abandoning the "middle way concept" of Nasution. The seminar concluded that ABRI had to lead from the front in order to maintain a balance of power in the country. A new doctrine called "Tri Ubaya Cakti" or the Three Sacred Efforts, brought the military's role into politics to the highest levels, military officers had wide access to participate in executive bodies.

Nasution's criticisms also include ABRI's relations with political parties and the manner in which the armed forces have increased their participation in non-military areas. He believes that ABRI should be above politics. He has objected to ABRI's close relations with GOLKAR, especially during elections. Nasution has implied that the manner the New Order has implemented the dual function of the armed forces places ABRI in the same position as the Dutch colonial army and this was contrary to Sudirman's position where ABRI should not become the "mere tool" of the government. [Ref. 28]

The former allies of the armed forces which helped to topple the Old Order, namely, the student groups, also criticized the military for its excessive practices in implementing its dual function. They considered that ABRI has used the opportunity to become deeply involved in day-to-day government practices by putting its officers in most key government positions. And in general, criticisms were focused on the misuse of power by the military authorities while practicing the socio-political aspect of their "Dwi Fungsi." Some military officers who became chiefs of villages, district heads, or even governors have often used force in implementing their authority, and some of them were considered to be incompetent for those positions.

In addition, many civilians have continued to assault ABRI's concept of "Dwi Fungsi," arguing that the country cannot progress unless "Dwi Fungsi" is removed. Among those criticisms, the harshest came from Sri Bintang Pamungkas, a leading Muslim politician who vied for PPP's leadership in August 1994, arguing that an armed forces of 500,000 strong, constituting only 0.3 percent of the country's population should not be given 20 percent of the seats in parliament. Furthermore, he concluded that ABRI is an obstacle to democracy and ABRI's domination of the political system has to be stopped. He gave examples of countries in Latin America which have abandoned such a concept and returned to the practice of civil supremacy [Ref. 28].

Some critics have also argued that ABRI should not place its personnel in environments outside of the Ministry of Defense and Security, on grounds that these tasks are reserved for civilians. Some critics disagree with the legal basis of "Dwi Fungsi ABRI." They believed that Dwi Fungsi ABRI has no constitutional basis and it's against their sacred principle of civilian supremacy over the military and that the military is nothing more than a mere tool of the state. Others argued that "kekaryaan ABRI" has reduced the opportunities for and placed obstructions to career plans of civilians.

Many outside observers have argued that Indonesia, due to the prominence and widespread presence of military personnel at the center and regional governments, has nothing but a military regime. This opinion is due to the dominance of the military, which

in Western governmental practices would be regarded as an aberration. As the world is going through a democratization process, criticisms of ABRI's dual function and its implementations will increase and may grow toward opposition and objection to it from within and without.

President Suharto's response to these criticisms is that the armed forces would continue to have a socio-political role in the country but would not be allowed to establish militarism. In defending ABRI's close relations with GOLKAR, he argued that ABRI had to choose its trusted partner in order to preserve and defend the state's ideology, "Pancasila." He said further, as quoted by Bilveer Singh, in the following [Ref. 28]:

I have not closed my eyes to the apprehension expressed by people abroad and even at home that the dual function of the armed forces and their stabilizing and dynamic role might one day give rise to a military, authoritarian or totalitarian government. This sort of fear is groundless. History has shown that even under the most critical circumstances, when the state and nation were faced with a threat to Pancasila, ABRI never thought or acted in a militarist manner.

In their role to uphold and defend the state ideology, the Armed Forces have, in fact, been a driving force behind the growth of Pancasila democracy through its implementation of the principle of a popular government guided by the wisdom of deliberation and representation. I am certain that ABRI will never slide into militarism, authoritarianism or totalitarianism because this is totally contrary to the democracy of Pancasila.

The military as a socio-political force is living and growing reality in our political system. As a conscious and responsible social and political force, ABRI is on equal status with the two political parties and GOLKAR.

In this connection, I want to reaffirm that the civic mission of ABRI is not designed to find places for military personnel in social and government activities. Instead, it gives ABRI, through its best members, the opportunity to serve the nation and the state beyond its main task as a force of defense and security. I hope ABRI will contribute their all to the growth of a dynamic and modern nation in the context of unity and integrity.

The size of ABRI's role depends on the intensity of the threat of danger to the safety of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, to the safety of the people, national unity and integrity and life in general, to any threat which poses a danger to the continued existence of the state, no matter whether this danger emanates from within or without.

The Armed Forces is not merely a paid army.... They share the right and duty to decide on national policy and the conduct of government. This is the main reason why the Armed Forces has a dual function as an instrument of the state and as a socio-political force. Today, tomorrow and at any time, ABRI is ready to defend Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and to stop any violation of these fundamental principles.

The question arises, will the Armed Forces ever turn into a military dictatorship? This will never happen. It would be impossible because ABRI abides by the Soldier's Oath and Sapta Marga, the seven principles of service. This how it should be...the role which ABRI has assumed did not arise from a thirst for power. If this was true, ABRI would have seized power when the opportunity was there, for example, on 1 October 1965, at a time when ABRI used its military power to stamp out the PKI insurrection. That was a moment when the country was in a state of panic and a vacuum existed in the government.... The fact is that ABRI followed constitutional procedures in pressing for change in political life and the administration. ABRI wanted life to be democratic and constitutional and this is precisely why ABRI defended Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Critics are too quick to say there is militarism in Indonesia. Whether or not there is should be judged according to the legal order in force. It should not merely be measured by the number of military uniforms. ABRI has not the slightest intention of monopolizing positions in the government, nor do they want to take over as many posts as possible or dominate any field of activity. Should an ABRI member prove to be unfit for any position, he will be withdrawn and replaced by someone who is better qualified...ABRI is fully convinced that it is not a matter of seats, power or positions, but it concerns national importance. The fundamental question is how to give our independence meaningful substance, how to create prosperity for all the people in the shortest possible time. Therefore, all the forces in society should combine in concerted effort, whether they be political parties, GOLKAR, social organizations or ABRI. It should be in the spirit of "andhum gawe," joining hands, not competing for positions and power.

An important factor to guarantee that the role of ABRI will never turn into militarism or dictatorship is the Armed Forces' doctrine or Sapta Marga. One of these seven principles of service says that the Armed Forces are the subjects of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila, that they uphold and defend the state

ideology, they are devoted to the One and only God, *Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*, and are the guardians of honesty, truth and justice.

Then, he concluded that ABRI's dual function will always exist as long as the people live in a state of national resilience and stability. He stated further that ABRI with its dual function is a stabilizing and dynamic element to guarantee stability and to strengthen national resilience.

Furthermore, in his speech at the Armed Forces Commanders' Meeting on March 27, 1980 in Pekanbaru, President Suharto again emphasized ABRI's relations with GOLKAR and argued, that before the New Order was born, Pancasila was submerged by various existing ideologies, whether it was Marxism, Leninism, Communism, Socialism, Marhaenism, Nationalism, and religion. He felt that the Pancasila was in danger because there was a certain party or group which not yet trusted Pancasila 100 percent. Thus ABRI in defending Pancasila should choose its trusted partner. And following the Pekanbaru's speech, Nugroho Notosusanto responded to criticisms about the excessive implementation of ABRI's dual function during the New Order by saying that based on the past experiences it is safer to involve ABRI completely in government although he realized there were some disadvantages [Ref. 28].

Thus, although the implementation of ABRI's dual function in the New Order Era has successfully brought the country toward high economic growth and a long period of political stability, ABRI's dual function practices has become an object of critics. Criticisms were more likely directed to how ABRI's dual function was implemented and less on its conception. Responses to those critics were put forward by President Suharto and other high ranking government officials to justify the role of ABRI in safeguarding the state ideology, Pancasila, and its contribution to the long period of political stability, the Indonesian people have enjoyed up until the present day. However, the post cold war period has brought some global issues which may stimulate criticism of the conception of ABRI's dual function or its implementation to be made even stronger. Will ABRI's dual

function be still relevant to the present and future Indonesia? If yes, how should it be implemented? This will be the big challenge for the future ABRI's leadership.

There were some points raised by Lieutenant General Sayidiman that are worthy of note and the consideration by ABRI leadership in order to improve the implementation of Dwi Fungsi ABRI in the future. He argued that much more needs to be done and undertaken to enhance civil-military relations for the benefit of the country. First, there should also be "civilian dwi fungsi," which should be equally responsible not just in their civilian tasks but also with regard to matters related to national security. He argued that part of the problem was that the civilian population is far more comfortable and trustful of the military as compared to the civilian leaders. This was very much due to the past legacies of instability under civilian rule. This will have to be changed for the good of the country. Thus, more civilians should be placed in important positions as their proficiency increases. Second, Dwi Fungsi should not be carried to extreme and its excesses should be checked. He felt that "kekaryaan ABRI" may have expanded to a point that is adequate, and should be limited in the future [Ref. 28].

IV. FUTURE PROSPECT OF ABRI'S DUAL FUNCTION

A. DETERMINING FACTORS

1. Impacts of Global Issues

In the post cold war era, an era of globalization, Indonesia will be confronted with four main tasks: to raise the socio-economic standards, enhance democratization, provide stronger commitment towards human rights protection, and stress greater concern for environmental problems. Of these issues, democratization and human rights' issues seem to be the main factors which will determine the future prospect of Dwi Fungsi ABRI. Some criticisms have been forwarded by the younger generation of Indonesian politicians such as Sri Bintang Pamungkas who stated that Indonesia will not able to progress unless Dwi Fungsi ABRI is removed. He has concluded that ABRI is an obstacle to democracy and that ABRI's domination of the political system must come to an end. In addition, he also gives as examples and as a recommendation what has happened in Russia, South Korea and Thailand where the armed forces have withdrawn from the political arena [Ref. 28]. Some arguments have been offered to counter that kind of criticism. One of them was by President Suharto who was quoted earlier in Chapter III. No one can guarantee such criticism will not exist in the future if Dwi Fungsi ABRI is implemented as it has been practiced in the past.

The results of government development programs have created a more informed populace with a higher consciousness of their rights. Modern communications with satellites and television providing news and information to the most remote villages from Sumatra to Irian Jaya, as well as to the crowded urban areas of the towns and cities, brings with it outside pressures which resulted in a more informed Indonesia society. The pressures stem from such controversial subjects such as democracy, human rights, labor relations, and freedom of speech and assembly. The security approach implemented by the government during the past years in order to maintain political stability has given a

negative image to the concept of Dwi Fungsi ABRI. Many people considered that ABRI with its "Dwi Fungsi" has practiced coercion and oppression in its efforts to maintain order and stability. Direct involvement of ABRI (or its element) in labor-employer disputes regarding basic payment, has given the impression that ABRI has acted against human rights' principles. A deterioration in labor relations has brought ABRI into active confrontation with protesters and demonstrators who demand a raise in wage and better working conditions. The sensitive issue of human rights was raised when in East Timor two religious incidents took place in June and July 1994 when Timorese protests, over alleged religious insults, led to a clash with riot police, in which about a dozen students and young people were injured, which necessitated Army intervention to restore order. However, ABRI which was generally credited with exercising considerable restraint in maintaining internal security, did not fire a single shot and employed minimum force to restore order in those incidents. In addition, the banning of the publications *Tempo*, *De Tik* and *Editor* by the government, caused disillusionment, dismay and general feeling that "keterbukaan" or openness has been put on hold and freedom of press and freedom of speech has been suppressed in the name of stability. [Ref. 24] This government's action has compromised ABRI's position as stabilizer and dynamizer in socio-political life in Indonesia. Popular perception is that ABRI cannot uphold its promise to enhance democracy and protect human rights in the country.

2. Internal Perspectives

Analyzing what has happened in Indonesian society and ABRI regarding the implementation of ABRI's dual function, Harold Crouch argued that within ABRI there are two main schools, the "Structural School" and the "Mental Dwi Fungsi School." The Structural School believes that in order to implement Dwi Fungsi, ABRI officers must participate directly in the government by occupying key positions in its structures. The rationale behind this is if ABRI withdraws from these positions the stability of the country could be undermined. In contrast, the Mental Dwi Fungsi School believes that Dwi Fungsi is more a state of mind rather than the physical occupation of strategic

political portfolios. This view argues that it is more important to have the right frame of mind among ABRI officers than to occupy key positions in government machinery. Thus, Dwi Fungsi should not be judged as a political idea and does not require ABRI officers to serve in the front-line of civilian positions, but rather that they be in a state of readiness with the right attitude so that it can become involved when required.

On the other hand, among civilians, there are also two perspectives, with the first rejecting Dwi Fungsi and the second supporting it only in a limited role. In the case of the former, Dwi Fungsi is nothing more than an attempt to legitimize the military's domination of politics in the country. This view argues that the military should withdraw from politics and become nothing more than a tool of the civilian government. In contrast, the latter view argues that a realistic view of the situation in the country is that political influence of the ABRI stems primarily from the power position of the armed forces in the country. This view also proposed a form of "power sharing" where only limited version of Dwi Fungsi would be practiced. [Ref. 28]

3. President's Policy Outcome

Analyzing President Suharto's policy concerning civil-military relations in his sixth term in presidential office, one can conclude that he has made up his mind to take the third option "Limited Handback," from the four basic Ulf Sundhaussen's options¹².

¹² Ulf Sundhaussen's offered four basic options of policy outcomes for future civil-military relations in Indonesia, namely: A continued veto regime. Suharto's regime is considered as a veto regime which was determined to retain power and restrict participation. Authoritarian Clientelism. This option seeks to retain power, and at the same time expand participation by co-opting the newly emergent or strengthened middle classes, rural 'kulaks' and industrial labor into an increasingly corporate system of government, represents a soft option which should have considerable appeal to the regime. It enables the present office holders to stay in power by granting political concessions to those forces which share a basic interest in maintaining the existing political and economic order. Limited Handback. This option is basically another soft option, towards the more liberal end of the scale of available options. It would involve allowing civilian politicians to take over the government, but participation in competing for power would be restricted to political forces which have the explicit approval of the military. Full Handback/Civilian Renewal. This option normally leads to the

This option is a soft option and at the more liberal end of the scale of available options. It would involve civilian politicians taking over the government, but participation in the competition for power would be restricted to political forces which have the explicit approval of the military [Ref. 25]. The selection of this option would mean that the PKI remained banned, and that former Masyumi leaders with known sympathies for separatist or even federalist views, would still be barred from possible positions of influence and power. Military officers would no longer dominate the government, and their participation would decline sharply. Civilian politicians will be more involved in government or the political arena of the country.

The sign that President Suharto took this option can be seen from his current policy. He has started a process of civilianization of the country's politics. He intervened personally to ensure the selection of the Information Minister Harmoko as the first non-military chairman of the ruling Golkar political machine. Giving more primacy to civilians has led to a new sense of open debate in public life. The debate centers on the armed forces' institutionalized role in politics. He seems to believe that the time has come for more civilian leadership because of international pressure for human rights, democratization, and good government [Ref. 30]. His policies as the Supreme Armed Forces Commander will strongly influence and determine the future of ABRI's socio-political roles.

Viewing the impacts of global issues on Indonesian society, the internal ABRI, civilian perspectives of ABRI's dual function and the trends of the President policy, one could ask the question in what direction will ABRI go in the future? Is Dwi Fungsi ABRI still relevant in present day Indonesia? Will Dwi Fungsi be left to the ABRI or will the ABRI become a professional soldier similar to the soldier in the western sense?

reintroduction of a fully democratic system. It was a regular feature in Latin American civil-military relations before 1964, when military intervention often led to limited-goal short-term moderator regimes. See Ulf Sundhaussen, *Indonesia: Slow March into an Uncertain Future*, in Christopher Clapham and George Philip (ed.), *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, Barnes & Noble Book, Totowa, New Jersey, 1985.

B. ABRI IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

1. Existence of ABRI's Dual Function

To determine if ABRI's dual function is still relevant or not to present Indonesian society, we should look back to ABRI's role in Indonesian history. From the very beginning ABRI had a role beyond that which is usually defined for the military. This was due to the manner in which the Indonesian Armed Forces were created, their role in saving the country, and their role in maintaining the unity of the nation. ABRI was born from the people, raised by the people, struggled with and for the people, and forms an indispensable part of the nation. ABRI perceived itself as the people's army and an integral part of Indonesian society. It has rights similar to other groups in Indonesian society as justified by the 1945 Constitution. ABRI became involved in politics because of various factors such as, the failure of the civilian politicians which forced ABRI to play a bigger socio-political role. ABRI remains critical as it is the only force that can ensure that "Pancasila" will continue as the national ideology. Lastly, ABRI is seen as the only national savior in view of the many crises the country has experienced.

ABRI has practiced its dual function since 1945 under Sudirman's leadership and has proven itself as the only force that can maintain stability and bring the country towards a higher level of development. In considering these facts, ABRI's dual function is important to the good of the country. It has a stabilizing role and has improved the rate of economic development, and this is why it should be preserved. What is needed is the adjustment of the dual function to the new environment. As General Sayidiman stated in his analysis, despite some qualitative changes, ABRI's dual function will remain relevant and necessary for the country. Furthermore, as quoted by Bilveer Singh:

I personally believe that the dual function will remain because it is part of ABRI's identity. It is well possible that there may be a certain change in the implementation of *kekaryaan* or maturing and modernization process of the Indonesian society requires more and more specialization and differentiation. It is therefore natural if more and more professionals are assigned to jobs requiring their professional capabilities. *Kekaryaan* would therefore be more and more applied to assignments of political

nature, like members of parliament or governors in certain provinces. I believe that in general the new generation of Armed Forces leaders will continue the attitude of the 1945 Generation, although there might be some differences in the nature of problems. This will safeguard the achievement of the national goals. [Ref. 28].

Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Feisal Tanjung, repeatedly stated that ABRI's dual function is not a temporary doctrine, because ABRI with its dual function is an integral part of and integrated with the people in order to achieve national goals. However, its operational and actualization need to be adjusted in order to meet the needs of a developing environment. Furthermore he stated that, although ABRI's dual function must be adjusted to the existing environment, it does not mean that we must change the fundamental doctrine of ABRI's dual function which adhered to an archipelago outlook, national resilience doctrines, and also ABRI's doctrine "Catur Dharma Eka Karma." Since he was appointed Commander in Chief of ABRI, he also repeatedly stated that ABRI has no intention of abandoning its dual function. There would be a need to reconsider its role in the changing socio-political climate but this would not mean that ABRI's dual function would be altered from its traditional direction [Ref. 28, 31].

Secondly, the national defense strategy, Total People's Defense, which was shaped by various constraints, including budget, has made it impossible to abandon ABRI's dual function. As quoted by Bilveer Singh, General Soebijakto has said:

Our national defense is based on the *Hankamrata* trilogy with its reliance on ABRI working with all of the people. Under this system, there are losses that have to be borne; the physical entry of any enemy cannot be checked. Only after entry can guerrilla war principles be applied to tie down, weaken, and then destroy the intruder. The losses to people and national assets are the risk accepted by politics of defense resilience. Indonesia has no better alternative, bearing in mind its currently strained economic circumstances. The concept calls for high capability to mobilize the people, such as was seen in Indonesia's second independence war.

The capability to mobilize the people in this fashion can no longer fashion this. Like it or not, it must be done by ABRI with civil assistance. Mobilization of the people is a political move with wide repercussions

with a strategic objective to be achieved. For that reason, it needs to be remembered that without political muscle, ABRI cannot implement the trilogy involved in the *Hankamrata* concept with its emphasis on an initial mobilization of the people to prepare them mentally and physically for the demands of resilience politics.

...if ABRI were to have no political competence, there would also be no ability to mobilize the people and the *Hankamrata* defense concept would be rendered inoperable. For this reason, as long as *Hankamrata* is retained as defense policy, ABRI must retain political power for its implementation either prior or subsequent to facing our potential enemy. [Ref. 28 p.169]

Thus General Soebijakto's logic was that ABRI's dual function must be preserved and continue to exist if the national defense strategy is to remain the same. Total People's Defense and Security System or "Sishankamrata" and ABRI's dual function are almost unalterable. Furthermore he stated, as Quoted by Bilveer Singh, as the following:

Its existence as a political power will be difficult to alter in the near future, unless the will of the people and the state of the nation force this to be altered. It should be admitted that socio-political roles of the military were obliged on the TNI by instability and violence over a long period that had severely weakened the nation and state.

It is logical that these functions should diminish as the issue of stability become less pressing before being turned over to the role of a non-ABRI counterpart. The opposite is also true: increased instability should call for an intensification of the socio-political role of ABRI. Logically, the answer to the question of when the army's dual role should end is simply that at the time when it is no longer required. This means when the *Hankamrata* resilience strategy is no longer needed. To achieve this, the nation must be economically strong enough to maintain an adequate regular army to be able to withstand outside forces.

This kind of ability will take a good length of time, particularly as we look at the very serious current problems of our economy. Aside from this, as we look forward to an end to instability, it is ABRI that has a wealth of experience in cadet formation and should be called on to help formation and training of non-ABRI cadets who can address the challenges of the future. They could be the backbone of the political counterpart.

The process of democracy being so called for in today's world will be difficult for ABRI to handle alone without the support of non-ABRI. The basic structure of ABRI does not lend itself to democracy nor to a

complete overhaul as was in 1945 and this means that ABRI members will have difficulty in getting the democratic experience it will so badly need. To formulate appropriate responses, ABRI as a socio-political force must constantly monitor world developments. Even these come in rapid fire succession, it is for ABRI to anticipate the impact and influence that they may generate internally. [Ref. 28 pp. 169-170]

From these two perspectives, we can conclude that ABRI's dual function will not be abandoned and will continue to exist in the near future. Although the dual function needs some adjustment in order to meet the developing environment, particularly in regard to the strong demand of the people for a more democratic climate in the political life of the country, the essence of ABRI's dual function will remain the same, only its actualization needs to be adjusted in order to fit the future and current environment. As stated by the Head of ABRI Information Service, Brigadier General Syarwan Hamid, in response to a press question on April 5, 1994, the essential principle of ABRI's role in socio-political affairs will not change, because ABRI is a part of the family of the nation which is based on kinship, and togetherness principles in developing the country. This statement was strengthened by Chairman of ABRI faction in DPR, Rear Admiral Abu Hartono, that the change that can be made to ABRI's dual function is a change in operational doctrine not its fundamental doctrine. The fundamental doctrine of ABRI's dual function is an expression of the people's will. So, changes of this basic doctrine would mean changes to the whole history of the country. Thus, ABRI's dual function is unalterable, and must be preserved for the good and safety of the country. The past continues to haunt Indonesia and to that extent, the majority of Indonesians would prefer that ABRI continue to perform its socio-political functions and Dwi Fungsi remain unaltered. There appears to be no alternative to this and the country will move forward with the armed forces continuing to play its dual function. The problem is, how it will be implemented in the future in which Indonesian society are more informed and conscious to their rights?

C. ABRI'S NEW PERSPECTIVE

Since ABRI's dual function is basic to ABRI, it will not be removed from ABRI as long as ABRI is still in existence. However, the implementation of ABRI's dual function will be adjusted from time to time to reflect the existing situation. In the future, ABRI will operate in a new environment which may challenge the implementation of ABRI's dual function. In ABRI it is necessary to appreciate the trends of Indonesia's future environment. According to Bilveer Singh there are three main trends, the first is the collapse of Soviet Union and communism in Europe which made possible the rise of new antagonisms, which were long suppressed by the East-West conflict. Implying that fundamental geopolitical changes that are taking place on the world landscape are also affecting Indonesia. The second trend is the rise of a new economics system. The world has moved rapidly towards economic integration with interdependence becoming a way of life. In turn, this has widespread ramifications on domestic politics, among other things, bringing about linkages between domestic and international politics. Hence, there are no longer clear boundaries between some domestic and international issues. The third trend is the shifting of actors in international relations. In the past, especially in Southeast Asia, the governments were the primary players, but increasingly that role has been assumed by multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations such as International Human Rights Organization, Red Crescent, CARE, and even the international financial institutions. They often drive a country's foreign policy considerations, which in turn, has a bearing on its national politics. [Ref. 28 p. 163]

Those trends in the environment will influence the future concept of the implementation of ABRI's dual function. This means that ABRI's dual function must become more acceptable and palatable to the non-governmental organization and to the international community, especially the various international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations. However, to face future challenges, ABRI has to take some steps regarding the implementation of ABRI's dual function in the changing environment. ABRI has to reevaluate the concept of its dual function in order to fit the

needs of the existing environment, and also it has to formulate broad guidelines as to how ABRI's dual function will be implemented in the near future.

A strategic study conducted by Indonesia's Defence and Security Department on ABRI's socio-political implementation in the changing environment, concluded that there are four options that ABRI can choose in order to implement its dual function in the future: [Ref. 33]

- Zero option suggest that ABRI return to its barracks-that means ABRI should withdraw totally from its involvement in the political life of the country.
- A fifty percent option suggests that ABRI maintain its role as stabilizer both in central DPR/MPR and in provinces/districts' level DPR.
- A seventy percent option suggests that ABRI must also function as a dynamizer in political life in the country by direct involvement in decision making process in the executive.
- A one hundred percent option suggests that ABRI should maintain its roles as pioneer, stabilizer, and dynamizer in socio-political life of the country so that the existence of unitary and unity of the country can be maintained and the country can achieve its ultimate goal, a just and prosperous society based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution.

Major General Mohammed Ma'ruf, the Armed Forces' Socio-Political Chief of Staff, in his first press conference on February 16, 1995, stated that the armed forces will take a back seat when it comes to politics and allow civilians to take all the initiatives. However, the armed forces is not completely washing its hands of politics and is prepared to move to the front anytime the situation may demand. Furthermore, he stated that the current position of ABRI in Indonesian political development is that as "tut wuri handayani," a philosophical Javanese expression meaning to supervise from behind. He continued, "if we have to move to the middle or to the front, we're ready for it. But, we feel that the political condition of the country currently is quite good and that is why we're giving liberty to other forces to play a less active role." [Ref. 31 p. 3] This perspective in favor to what Harold Crouch categorized as "Mental Dwi Fungsi School"

which sees ABRI's dual function as more a state of mind or a deliberate withholding of the power required to preserve a dual function of ABRI rather than the occupation of strategic political positions, and believes that it is more important to have the right frame of mind among ABRI officers than occupy key positions in governmental machinery. This means that the numbers of ABRI officers assigned to government will be reduced. This perspective is in line with his predecessor, General Hartono, now the Army Chief of Staff, who stated that ABRI's position in the state and national life today and in the future is a guiding force from behind which this does not mean to restrict itself from actively being involved in decisionmaking process. ABRI's role as stabilizer and dynamizer will always adhere to ABRI until the indefinite future.

What General Ma'ruf and General Hartono have said reemphasized President Suharto's statement in March 1994 when he gave a speech on the anniversary of KOSTRAD, the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command. He stated that ABRI's spirit, doctrine, strategy and programs have all been designed and established as part of the whole national system. ABRI has participated in development programs and this will continue in the future. He continued "there are times for ABRI to take a leading role, times when ABRI must work shoulder to shoulder with the others, and times when ABRI must take the back seat, providing guidance and letting other forces take the leading role." According to him, the present political situation requires that ABRI must "tut wuri handayani" or take the back seat, providing guidance and letting other forces take the leading role.

From the above mentioned, one can conclude that the future direction of ABRI will still be much influenced by the wisdom and vision of President Suharto, individually or in his capacity as the supreme ABRI commander. So that, ABRI will more likely take the second option, the Fifty Percent option, which obliged ABRI to gradually withdraw from the executive but remain actively involved in legislative affairs by continuing its role as stabilizer or balancing force in the process of achieving consensus. This option is logical, because Indonesia under the New Order has achieved a high level of socio-

economic development through the six “Repelitas” (five-year development program). According to Huntington and Nelson in Costantine P. Danapoulus, *The Decline of Military regime: The Civilian Influence*, Westview Press, London, 1988, there are five spin-offs resulting from high levels of socio-economic development and participation:

- Expansion of education which promotes social mobility, greater awareness, and political consciousness.
- Emerging conflict between new and traditional groups leads to social and political diversity.
- Proliferation in the number of professional groups and associations.
- Expansion of the function of government which multiplies the ways government affects the citizens lives and in turn precipitates a greater urge on the part of the citizenry to take part in decisions affecting them.
- A closer identification between the individuals and the state.

Military organization will be affected by these kinds of societal manifestations in which a high level of socio-economic development and participation generate greater pressure on the military to withdraw and allow the civilian politicians in the lead [Ref. 4 p. 4].

Thus, in the near future ABRI will put itself in the back seat and be ready to take control when the situation requires it, saying nothing but knowing when to exercise its power. If ABRI was to take a back seat, as an organization it should take some necessary steps in order to enhance its capability to judge the existing situation and to be more professional in conducting its dual function in the future.

D. NECESSARY STEPS

ABRI both as a defense and socio-political force has to upgrade itself in order to be able to be successful in conducting its mission in the future. Because of this reason, ABRI leadership must determine and take the necessary actions, so that the implementation of ABRI's dual function will be more realistic and suitable to the existing environment. Considering criticisms and tendencies of future environment, ABRI should

make some improvements in four major aspects of the future environment namely: political concept, structure, socialization, and professionalism.

1. Political Concept

Bilveer Singh recognized that ABRI has inconsistently applied its concept of dual function. Dual function of ABRI as envisaged by Sudirman was different from that of Nasution and also different from that of Suharto's. Harold Crouch came to the conclusion that within ABRI itself there are two schools of thought which have different perceptions in implementing the concept of ABRI's dual function. One school more likely to support Suharto's conception and the other in favor to Sudirman's and Nasution's concept. To avoid this inconsistency in the future, ABRI leadership must decide and formulate a clear concept of ABRI's dual function. In doing this ABRI leadership should always consider the fundamentals of ABRI political culture and spirit which is always oriented to the people and to the existence of the country based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. ABRI's Commander-in-Chief, General Feisal Tanjung, stated that there are five principles that should be considered in transforming ABRI's political culture and included in any concept concerning the future implementation of ABRI's socio-political function so that it is always valid and can adapt itself to rapid national progress. These principles are: [Ref. 22, 34]

- Patriotism, which means that the ABRI in conducting its mission must always maintain its identity as patriot of the nation. In the existing situation, this identity must always be upheld in solving problems existing in Indonesian society.
- Sense of responsibility, which means that the ABRI should always be responsible for the continuation of the national struggle in achieving Indonesia ultimate goals. Although this responsibility is shared with other groups in Indonesian society, ABRI must take the lead in efforts to develop the nation and to preserve Pancasila.
- Democratic, which means that ABRI must always orient itself to the people, because ABRI was born of the people, lived and struggled together with the

people and ABRI has struggled for the well-being of the people. ABRI will not be able to accomplish its mission without support from the people.

- Solidarity or togetherness, which means that ABRI must always develop solidarity based on a sense of mutual cooperation among people as an element of the country in conducting its mission. Every citizen and element of the country feels that it has the same importance, none over another, in the services of the nation.
- Openness and responsible freedom, which means that the ABRI in developing the political system in the country must always develop a conducive political condition by encouraging openness and freedom.

Beside these, ABRI leadership needs also to reemphasize the goal and the essence of socio-political function of ABRI, so that every ABRI member acts with a uniformity of understanding of the concept of ABRI's dual function, and in turn, every ABRI member will act consistently in implementing ABRI's non-military function. In order to achieve this objective, it may be wise if ABRI leadership invites all the schools of thought from within ABRI and other outside experts. The ABRI should gather them to formulate the fundamental concept of ABRI's non-military function through seminars or other kinds of scientific meetings. Once the non-military function is formulated, it must be implemented consistently. A 1978 Seskoad Paper may be worth considering for the basic reference in formulating a future concept of ABRI's non-military function.

2. Structure

The present ABRI's socio-political organization consists of council organization, staff and executive bodies, and ABRI's civic workers organization. Council organization called ABRI's Socio-Political Council is a consultative body which is responsible for formulating policies on ABRI's socio-political matters. ABRI's Socio-Political Councils are established in the capital down to the provincial level and are aligned with the structure of ABRI's and government's organization. Staff organization and executive bodies are responsible for assisting ABRI leadership in determining policy regarding

ABRI's function in socio-political affairs. ABRI's civic worker's organization are responsible for coordinating ABRI's civic workers in their area of responsibility.

From the present structure of the ABRI's socio-political affairs one can see that there are no institutions that provide research and development. For future purposes, there is an urgent need for ABRI's organization to develop an institution which has special duties of conducting research and development of ABRI's political strategies and conceptions. This is required for ABRI to successfully achieve its political goals. If ABRI as a socio-political force can claim itself to be a stabilizer and dynamizer of political life in the country, it must always come to the table with fresh ideas in order to promote a better political climate in the country. For this reason there is an urgent requirement for ABRI to establish an institution that is specially dedicated to doing research and development in the field of socio-political affairs. Such an institution should be established only in the center of ABRI's Headquarters with a primary mission to continuously advise the ABRI commander-in-Chief on socio-political affairs and development of the ABRI socio-political strategies in order to further ABRI's political interest, and to maintain the unity and unitary of the nation based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution.

There are two ways to establish such an institution. ABRI can expand the scope of mission of the present ABRI's research and development body, "Puslitbang ABRI" or ABRI's Center of Research and Development with its primary mission to conduct research and development on ABRI's hardware, by assigning it the additional mission of conducting research and development in the field of socio-political affairs. Membership of this body can be increased with personnel who are expert or qualify for that purpose, either ABRI officers or non ABRI intellectuals. The other way is to establish a new institution which is dedicated for the purpose of conducting research and development in the field of socio-political functions or non-military functions of ABRI. Membership of this institution may consist of ABRI's and civilian political experts who are willing to monitor continuously the implementation of ABRI's non-military function and observe

the trend of political development and political situation in the country. The first option seems to be more efficient and more feasible for ABRI which is limited in budget and resources.

3. Socialization

ABRI realized that not all Indonesian intellectuals understand ABRI's dual function. Most of them still perceived that ABRI's dual function as identical to ABRI's civic missions (*Kekaryaan*). More extreme views of some of the civilian intellectuals or politicians represented ABRI's dual function as an obstacle in its efforts to develop democracy in the country. In order to prevent such a misinterpretation of ABRI's dual function, intensive socialization efforts must be implemented which are directed to both ABRI and non-ABRI citizens.

Methods used for the socialization effort can be varied ranging from seminar, discussions, to formal lecture depending on the objective. For instance, the military knowledge of a territorial defense course, known as "Kewiraan," given to graduate students, should be intensified and may be expanded to include discussion on ABRI's conception of its dual function. Seminars on conception, and implementation of ABRI's socio-political function should be conducted frequently by inviting non-ABRI personnel who have expertise in various disciplines. This will allow ABRI to gather inputs from different sources in order to develop strategies, operations, and tactics concerning its socio-political function.

4. Professionalism

ABRI with its dual function implicitly has two missions. ABRI must be able to defend the country from any threat. In this context, ABRI must be able to win the war against any external or internal armed forces which threaten the integrity of The Republic of Indonesia. Second, ABRI must also be able to win a war against socio-political force which threatens the existence of Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. To accomplish those missions, ABRI personnel must be professional in both military and socio-political fields. Many critics of the implementation of ABRI's

dual function, have addressed the lack of ABRI competence in conducting their mission in the field of socio-political affairs. Present and future challenges facing ABRI in the field of socio-political affairs demand that a more qualified ABRI officer hold political positions either in the executive or in legislative side of the government. Consequently, ABRI should increase the skills and education of its members. Following are some possible ways, in my opinion, to be considered:

- Encourage ABRI officers to qualify for graduate level education. This alternative will give ABRI sufficient numbers of qualified officers to fulfill the needs of non-military positions.
- Talent Scouting. This alternative would require ABRI leadership to screen ABRI officers in order to find personnel who are potentially qualified for non-military positions. Those officers who are potentially qualified for a non-military position should be given a chance to obtain their graduate or higher level education in educational institution either within the country or abroad. In regard to career management, those officers should be directed to a socio-political career track so that they could be effective. This does not mean that an officer who is potentially qualified for non-military position will have no military career. They should have a better chance to become ABRI leader in the future because they have some added value compared to the others who have only a single experience.

In summary, ABRI's dual function will continue to exist in the future as long as there is a need to preserve the unitary state of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Anticipating the current internal political condition, ABRI will take the back seat and let other political forces take the lead, but ABRI will be ready to participate if the situation requires it. This does not mean that ABRI withdraw itself from the political arena but rather it will reduce its involvement in government positions. In facing the future challenges in a socio-political field, ABRI must take the necessary steps in order to be successful in conducting its socio-political function in the future. Those steps include four major aspects of the Indonesian environment namely: political conception, structure, socialization, and professionalism.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSION

ABRI , the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, is different from other countries' armed forces especially those in most Western countries where the military's role is perceived essentially as in support of political aspirations of a society under civilian leadership. ABRI is not a passive tool of the government, rather, it is actively involved in the decisionmaking process. The reasons for ABRI being deeply involved in non-military affairs can be explained by examining ABRI history, the Indonesian Constitution, and Indonesian culture. Historically, the involvement of the military in non-military affairs began at the time of the ABRI formation during the revolution against Dutch rule and has continued ever since. The explanations for the involvement of Indonesian Armed Forces in the political arena is two-fold. According to Harold Crouch, the first, is that the basic orientation of military officers has been political from the very beginning. Most officers did not join the army because they were interested in pursuing a professional military career. Rather they were motivated by the desire to participate in the nationalist struggle against colonialism. Secondly, the failure of civilian politicians to form a stable government in the post independence period. The party-dominated system of liberal democracy proved unable to produce a stable civilian government. The civilian-led system of guided democracy, in which the military participated directly, also failed to establish a strong and effective regime. When the military took full power in 1966, and the New Order under Suharto assumed control, it was able to present itself as the only political force capable of guaranteeing order and stability in a nation which had undergone almost continuous political upheaval during the previous two decades. The military dominated government has achieved a high rate of economic growth which has brought great benefit to the country with a population of more than 190 million.

During the New Order era, the Indonesian Armed Forces has been directly involved in decisionmaking process. Many military officers were given opportunities to occupy government strategic positions either as ministers or as regional administrators such as governors, district head, mayors, and other high ranking officials in the regional bureaucracy. The roles of the military in socio-political affairs have been recognized as a stabilizer and dynamizer of the socio-political climate in the country. As stabilizer, the military officers in government or in legislative bodies were obliged to function as balancing force by putting themselves in the center of any dispute among groups in the process of achieving consensus. As dynamizer, the military officers are obliged to initiate efforts for the creation of a conducive environment for more dynamic socio-political condition in the country.

Constitutionally, the involvement of ABRI in non-military affairs is based on articles in the 1945 Constitution, Article 27(Sub 1) and Article 2 (Sub 1). Article 27 (Sub 1) stated that all Indonesian citizens have equal status before the law and in government and shall abide by the government without any exception. All ABRI members are Indonesian citizens. Therefore, logically, every ABRI member has the right to be involved in the government. While Article 2(sub 1) stated that the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) shall consist of the members of the People's House of Representatives (DPR) augmented by the delegates from the regional territories and groups as provided for by statutory regulations. The word "group" in this article means functional groups existing in Indonesian society. ABRI is one of the existing functional groups in Indonesian society, so, ABRI also has the right to participate in the highest body in Indonesia's political structure.

The legal basis of the involvement of ABRI in non-military affairs was strengthened by some MPR decrees which basically emphasized the dual function of ABRI, as a defense and security force and as a socio-political force. Indonesian culture, which is based on kinship, recognized that every individual in Indonesian society has the same rights and responsibilities to work together in order to achieve the national goals.

By this view, Indonesian society shows no dichotomy between military and civilian, and ABRI is considered as one profession or group in Indonesian society. Additionally, the involvement of ABRI in non-military affairs is obliged by the defense strategy adopted by Indonesia, "Sishankamrata" or Total People's Defense System, which involve all elements in Indonesian society in defending the country from either outside or internal threats with ABRI the nucleus. The success of this system depends on the unity between ABRI and the people. To fulfill this, ABRI is obliged to exercise non-military functions which are political in nature.

The end of the cold war and super power rivalries resulted in the reduction of global tensions and the settlement of regional conflicts at international level. Despite all of these, some global issues still exist such as democracy, human rights and environment. These global issues have influenced the Indonesian people in seeing their country as a developing democratic government. The dominance of ABRI in government has become the main target of criticisms. Those criticisms are mainly focused on the existing government practices of democracy linked with the involvement of ABRI officers in the executive and legislature. The government is accused of being undemocratic and ABRI involvement in the executive politics is perceived as the hindrance of democracy development in the country.

. Ironically, one of the critics is also the founding father of ABRI's dual function, General Nasution. He criticized the dominance of ABRI officers in Suharto's administration which, according to him, is against the fundamental concept of ABRI's dual function. Based on those criticisms, ABRI leadership has taken some necessary steps in order to determine the future of ABRI's dual function. Reevaluation of ABRI's concept has been ordered and opinions of social and political experts have been gathered. The incumbent ABRI's Commander-in-Chief, General Feisal Tanjung, has declared that there will be no change in the fundamental concept of ABRI's dual function, but its implementation will adjust to the existing environment. Based on the present political condition in Indonesia, leadership has decided to put ABRI in a position as "Tut Wuri

Handayani," supervise from behind and letting other political force to take the lead, but ABRI is ready to participate when the situation requires, in socio-political life in Indonesia. This decision is in line with President Suharto's perception on political condition in present day Indonesia. In his capacity either as ABRI's Supreme Commander or as an individual, strongly influences the decision of ABRI leadership regarding the future implementation of ABRI's dual function.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Regardless of who is behind the scene of ABRI's decision to reduce its involvement in government, ABRI leadership should take the necessary steps in order to improve ABRI's performance in implementing its dual function in the future. These necessary steps, in my opinion are, first, to reformulate or reemphasize the fundamental concept of ABRI's dual function. To publish the practical manuals so as to equip all ABRI personnel with a thorough understanding of the concepts and also equip them to appropriately implement those concepts. These concepts should stress the position of ABRI in the political system of the country, which obligates ABRI to be independent of alignment with any political group, and that ABRI must put itself above all political groups by not aligning itself to a certain group in the country. Secondly, when all fundamental and practical concepts of ABRI's dual function have been formulated, it must be disseminated to all of ABRI personnel and all of the Indonesian society through seminars, discussions, formal lectures in universities or colleges, and mass media.

The ABRI organization should establish a research and development institution which is dedicated to conduct research and development on ABRI's socio-political function. This institution should be expected to produce strategic, operational, and tactical conceptions of ABRI's socio-political functions in regard to the trend of socio-political conditions in Indonesia in particular and the world in general. Those conceptions may be expected to be used by ABRI leadership in determining policies and decisions on the implementation of ABRI's socio-political function.

In order to enhance the ABRI officers' professionalism, ABRI leadership should encourage them to obtain graduate or higher level education by either government or individual funding. Officers who obtain those degrees should be given credit to their career development, so that they feel their efforts are recognized. Some advantages can be obtained by having officers who have high level education. Among them are, first, ABRI's organization will be more effective and efficient in accomplishing its mission both as a defense and security force and as a socio-political force. Secondly, ABRI officers assigned to civilian positions will be more accepted and respected by their counterparts in that environment, and finally, the image of ABRI's incompetence in conducting its socio-political role can be eliminated with posting qualified officers in political positions.

APPENDIX

INDONESIAN

ACRONYMS AND TERMS

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
APRA	Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (The Army of the Just King)
BKR	Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Body)
BPKKP	Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang (Assistance Body for War Victim Family)
BKS	Badan Kerja Sama (Cooperative Body)
CADEK	Catur Dharma Eka Karma (Four Missions, One Sacred Deed)
DPRI-RI	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (The House of People's Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia)
Dwi Fungsi	Dual Functions
GOLKAR	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
KOSTRAD	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (The Army Strategic Reserve Command)

MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
NASAKOM	Nasional Agama Komunis (Nationalist, Religious, and Communist)
Pancasila	Five Fundamental Principles; the belief of one supreme God, justice and civility among the people, the unity of Indonesia, democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives, and social justice for all.
PETA	Pembela Tanah Air (Volunteer Army for the Defence of the Fatherland)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesia Communist Party)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
RMS	Republik Maluku Selatan (The Republic of South Maluccas)
SISHANKAMRATA	Sistim Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (Total People's Defense and Security System)
SUPERSEMAR	Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (The Order of March 11th)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)

UUD

Undang Undang Dasar (Constitution)

REFERENCES

1. Nordlinger, Eric A., *Soldier in Politics: Military Coup and Government*, Prentice Hall, Inc, Englewood Cliff, NJ, 1977.
2. Kerwin, Jerome G., *Civil-Military Relationship in American Life*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1948.
3. Danapoulos, Constantine P., *From Military to Civilian Rule*, Routledge, London, 1992.
4. Danapoulos, Constantine P., *The Decline of Military Regimes: The Civilian Influence*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1988.
5. Crouch, Harold, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1978.
6. Maniruzzaman, Talukder, *Military Withdrawal from Politics*, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
7. Fredrick, William H. and Robert L. Worden, *Indonesia a Country Study*, Federal Research Library of Congress, 1992.
8. Bienen, Henry and David Morell, *Political Participation under Military Regimes*, Sage Publications, Beverly Hill, CA, 1976.
9. Finer, S.E., *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1988.
10. Green, Marshall, *Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation 1965-1968*, The Compass Press, Washington, D.C, 1990.
11. Cochran, Charles L., *Civil Military Relations*, The Free Press, NY, 1974.
12. Notosusanto, Nugroho, "Indonesia: Armed Forces and Society into 1980s", in C.M. Kelleher, *Political Military System: Comparative Perspectives*, Sage, 1974.
13. Vatikiotis, Michael R. J, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto*, Routeledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc, NY, 1993.
14. Department of Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia, *Manual of the Dual Function of the Armed Forces*, Jakarta, 1982.

15. Jackson , Karl D. and Lucian W. Pye, *Political Power and Communication in Indonesia*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, CA, 1978.
16. Clapham, Christopher and George Philip, *The Political Dilemma of Military Regimes*, Barnes & Noble Books, Totowa, NJ, 1985.
17. Department of Information of Republic of Indonesia, *The 1945 Constitution of Republic of Indonesia*, Jakarta, 1989.
18. Held, David, *Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy*, Stanford University Press, CA, 1989.
19. Department of Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Services, *Indonesia, an Official Handbook*, Perum Percetakan Negara, 1993.
20. Department of Information Republic of Indonesia , Brig. Gen. Nugroho Notosusanto, *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia*, Jakarta, 1979.
21. Crouch, Harold, "Indonesia", in his and Zakaria, *Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia*, 1985.
22. Soebijono, SH, "Development of ABRI's Function as Social-Political Force", in A.S.S. Tambunan, *ABRI's Dual Function: Development and Its Role in Political Life in Indonesia*, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta, 1992.
23. MacIntyre, Andrew, "Indonesia in 1993: Increasing Political Movement?", in *Asian Survey Volume XXXIV*, No. 2, February 1994.
24. East, Colonel Colin, "Java, the Inner Kingdom", in *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Annual Reference Edition*, 1995.
25. Sundhaussen, Ulf and Barry R. Green, "Indonesia: Slow March into an Uncertain Future", in Christopher Clapham and George Philip, *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, Barnes & Noble Books, Totowa, NJ, 1985.
26. Caraka Warta, "Monthly Brochure of The Office of Indonesian Military Attaché", Washington D.C., June 1994.
27. Soebijono, SH, "The Implementation of ABRI's Social-Political Function", in A.S.S Tambunan, *ABRI's Dual Function: Development and Its Role in Political Life in Indonesia*, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta, 1992.

28. Singh, Bilveer, *Dwi Fungsi ABRI, the Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Origins, Actualization and Implications for Stability and Development*, Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 1995.
29. Notosusanto, Nugroho, *Armed Forces and Society in Indonesia: Past, Present and Future*, Department of Defence and Security Center for Armed Forces History, Jakarta, 1974.
30. McBeth, John, "Indonesia: Father Knows Best, Suharto's Civilianisation Push Raises Military Hackles", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 25, 1993.
31. Caraka Warta, "Monthly Brochure of The Office of Indonesian Military Attaché", Washington D.C., March 1995.
32. Furnivall, J.S, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*, New York University Press, 1956.
33. F.M. Parapat, Strategic Study No.13/1989: *ABRI socio-political Strategy in 1989-1998*, Directorate General for General Planning and Budget of Defence and Security Department of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 1989.
34. "Angkatan Bersenjata" Daily News, *Dwi Fungsi ABRI tidak bersifat Sementara or ABRI's Dual Function is not a Temporary Doctrine*, Jakarta, April 9, 1994.
35. Zia Qureshi (team leader), *A world Bank Country Study: Indonesia Sustaining Development*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, D.C, 1994.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION

		No. Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22304-6145	2
2.	Library, Code 052 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	2
3.	Curriculum Officer, Code 36 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	1
4.	N522 OPNAV Room 4 E 475 Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20350-2000	1
5.	Professor Sterling Session, SM/Ss Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	1
6.	Professor Thomas C. Bruneau, Code NS/Bn Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5101	1
7.	Office of the Defense Attache Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia 2020 Massachussetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C., 20036	1
8.	Kassospol ABRI Cilangkap, Jakarta Timur Indonesia	1
9.	Aspers Kasum Cilangkap, Jakarta Timur Indonesia	1

- | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|
| 10. | Asops Kasad
Jl. Merdeka Utara 3
Jakarta Pusat
Indonesia | 1 |
| 11. | Dirhub TNI-AD
Jl. S. Parman 103
Jakarta Barat
Indonesia | 1 |
| 12. | I Gede Wajan Sardjana
Bank Sarwa Sedhana
Jl. P. Menjangan 14 B
Tabanan-Bali
Indonesia | 1 |